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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In late February 2009, Rita Cote, a mother of four, called police in 
[the] Central Florida town [of Tavares] because her sister was allegedly 
attacked by her boyfriend. But when police showed up, rather than focus 
on the actual crime, they turned on Cote, who doesn’t speak English.  
  Tavares is located in Lake County. And the Lake County sheriff . . . 
 
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco. Many thanks to Maya Manian, Kate Desormeau, and 
Kristen Holmquist for their suggestions on an early draft of this article. Danielle Johnston, Laurie 
Furstenfeld, and Emily Gibbs provided excellent research assistance. Special thanks to Amy Wright, 
the online research services librarian at the University of San Francisco School of Law. 
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had campaigned on the promise that he would deport illegal immigrants.  
 The police demanded to see Cote’s papers, and when she only offered 
a bank identification card, they arrested her.  
 The man who had allegedly left marks and bruises on her sister was 
never even picked up. 
 As bad as that might be, it gets worse. She was held for eight days 
without being able to contact family. She was transferred to immigration 
authorities in Broward County, in South Florida, hours away from her 
family, before finally being released. By the way, her children and husband 
are all American citizens. . . . In fact, her husband is an Iraq War veteran.1 
Cote was fortunate to be released from immigration custody. Danny Sigui 
was not so lucky: 
In Providence, Rhode Island, Guatemalan immigrant Danny Sigui helped 
convict a murderer by providing critical testimony against the accused. 
During preparation of the case, the state attorney general’s office learned 
that Sigui was an undocumented immigrant, and reported him to the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). . . . When asked whether he 
would have come forward again, knowing that doing so would lead to his 
deportation, Sigui replied: “If I had known they would take my liberty, 
that they would take my children away from me, that they would put me 
[in immigration detention], I would not do this.” 2  
Sigui was deported following the trial,3 in spite of an appeal from friends and the 
state attorney general office to allow him to stay.4 
As private persons attempting to assist local law enforcement officials 
apprehend criminals, Cote and Sigui could have been spared the immigration 
enforcement nightmare had there been sanctuary policies in their communities.5 
Policies that instruct officers to refrain from asking crime victims or witnesses 
 
1. Ralph De La Cruz, ‘The Police Took Mommy’: How Reporting a Crime Nearly Resulted in 
Deportation for Florida Woman, FLA. CTR. FOR INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING (Jan. 31, 2011), 
http://fcir.org/2011/01/31/the-police-took-mommy-how-reporting-a-crime-nearly-resulted-in-
deportation-for-florida-woman. 
2. LYNN TRAMONTE, IMMIGR. POLICY CTR., DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF “SANCTUARY 
CITIES” 3 (2009), available at http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Community 
PolicingPaper3-09.pdf. 
3. Id. 
4. Tatiana Pina, Guatemalan Immigrant to Be Deported, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 6, 2003, at A1. 
5. Admittedly, even in San Francisco, California, where there is a sanctuary policy, its 
application has not always been consistent. In one high profile incident that occurred in 2004, a 
stabbing victim reached out to San Francisco police officers for help. Philip Hwang, Call the Cops, Get 
Deported, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN, Feb. 8–14, 2006, at 7. She was shocked when police turned her over 
to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents, while her assailant went unpunished. Id. The 
Office of Citizen Complaints launched an investigation, concluded that the police had violated the 
Sanctuary Ordinance, and forwarded the case to the Police Department for discipline. Id. The primary 
officer simply was given retraining. Id.; see also infra note 328. 
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about their immigration status are in place in more than seventy cities and states,6 
such as San Francisco and New York, and are also followed by many law 
enforcement agencies, such as the New Haven and Los Angeles police 
departments.7 Thousands of other police agencies are reluctant to be viewed as 
partners in federal immigration enforcement.8 The motivation behind these laws 
and policies is simple: to encourage the entire community—including immigrant 
members—to trust and cooperate with the police to promote public safety for 
everyone.9 If this message is delivered successfully, I also believe that its tone is an 
important, positive step in encouraging the civic integration of immigrant 
communities that stands in sharp contrast to the xenophobic undercurrent of 
measures such as Arizona’s S.B. 107010 and the billions of dollars spent annually in 
border and interior enforcement of federal immigration laws.11  
Sanctuary ordinances or policies that constrain local authorities from 
assisting in federal immigration enforcement do not receive the same political and 
media attention as anti-immigrant laws enacted by states and local governments. 
In the political struggle over the rights of undocumented immigrants in the United 
States, the greater media and political focus on anti-immigrant measures, such as 
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and similar policies in cities like Hazleton, Pennsylvania, and 
Farmers Branch, Texas, is understandable.12 The widely publicized proposal and 
 
6. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 4; Benjamin Wachs, Sanctuary City: Now Endorsed by 17,945 Law 
Enforcement Agencies Nationwide, S.F. WEEKLY, Aug. 26, 2008, http://blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch 
/2008/08/sanctuary_city_now_endorsed_by.php. An anti-immigrant organization, Ohio Jobs and 
Justice PAC, maintains a constantly updated website that lists dozens of cities and localities that it 
considers sanctuary cities. Steve Salvi, The Original List of Sanctuary Cities, USA, http://ojjpac.org/ 
sanctuary.asp (last visited Nov. 3, 2011). 
7. See infra notes 36–43, 80–82 and accompanying text. 
8. Pamela Constable, Many Officials Reluctant to Help Arrest Immigrants, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 
2008, at B1. 
9. In the words of Police Chief Charlie Dean of Prince William County, Virginia, “I have a 
responsibility to provide service to the entire community—no matter how they got here. It is in the 
best interest of our community to trust the police.” DEBRA A. HOFFMASTER ET AL., POLICE EXEC. 
RESEARCH FORUM, POLICE AND IMMIGRATION: HOW CHIEFS ARE LEADING THEIR 
COMMUNITIES THROUGH THE CHALLENGES 15–16 (2010), available at http://policeforum.org/ 
library/immigration/PERFImmigrationReportMarch2011.pdf. 
10. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§ 11-1051 (2010) (commonly known as S.B. 1070). 
11. BILL ONG HING, DEPORTING OUR SOULS 178–82 (2006); BILL ONG HING, ETHICAL 
BORDERS 29–63 (2010). 
12. Arizona’s S.B. 1070 included provisions that required police officers to check the 
immigration status of everyone arrested in the state, made it a state crime to not have lawful status or 
to work in the state without authorization, and authorized state officers to enforce the civil provisions 
of the federal Immigration and Nationality Act. See generally United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 
(9th Cir. 2011). In 2006, the northeastern Pennsylvania city of Hazleton passed an ordinance that 
sought to deny business permits to companies that employ undocumented immigrants, fine landlords 
who rent to them, and require legal tenants to register and pay for a rental permit. Lozano v. City of 
Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 176–80 (3d Cir. 2010). The Farmers Branch ordinance similarly would 
require all adults in the city who live in rental housing to register with the city and provide citizenship 
and immigration information in order to obtain a so-called “residential occupancy license.” Villas at 
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enactment of those laws are countered by vociferous opposition from immigrants 
and their allies. The protests generally are followed by high-profile lawsuits that 
challenge the propriety and constitutionality of the laws. Supporters of the 
subfederal anti-immigrant statutes argue that they must act because federal 
policymakers and enforcement officials have failed at their jobs. Detractors raise 
serious legal questions about the ability of state and local officials to act in a field 
that generally has been viewed as an exclusive federal domain. 
With much less fanfare, the legality of sanctuary policies also has been 
challenged. For example, in City of New York v. United States,13 New York City 
unsuccessfully argued that a federal statute that appeared to interfere with the 
city’s sanctuary policy violated the Tenth Amendment. The federal Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit reasoned that Congress was not forcing the city to 
enforce immigration laws, but simply barred any local restrictions that might 
interfere with voluntary cooperation by state or local officials with federal 
immigration agents.14 But in Sturgeon v. Bratton,15 a California court of appeal found 
no conflict between the same federal statute and the sanctuary policy of the Los 
Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and dismissed a challenge to the sanctuary 
policy by a disgruntled taxpayer.16 Those cases are discussed more fully in Part III. 
Understanding why sanctuary policies are constitutional is important to the 
raging debate over immigration. Seemingly on a daily basis, anti-immigrant 
measures are proposed or enacted by state and local governments.17 In contrast, 
some jurisdictions that regard gaining the trust of immigrant communities as a 
necessity for public safety or that view themselves as immigrant friendly choose an 
approach that de-emphasizes the immigration status of those encountered in the 
course of police work. As Sturgeon v. Bratton illustrates, anti-immigrant groups stand 
ready to challenge those policies.18 Additionally, the proliferation of litigation 
challenging the constitutionality of anti-immigrant ordinances raises the question 
of whether one set of subfederal immigration-related approaches (sanctuary 
policies) can be constitutional, while a different set (anti-immigrant legislation) is 
not. To put it bluntly, can those in the immigrant rights community that promote 
 
Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 701 F. Supp. 2d 835, 839 (N.D. Tex. 2010), aff’d, No. 
10–10751, 2012 WL 952252 (5th Cir. Mar. 21, 2012). 
13. 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999). 
14. See infra notes 89–111 and accompanying text. 
15. 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718 (Ct. App. 2009). 
16. See infra notes 112–44 and accompanying text. 
17. In the first quarter of 2010 alone, state legislators in forty-five states introduced 1,180 bills 
and resolutions relating to immigration; by the end of March, thirty-four state legislatures had passed 
seventy-one laws and adopted eighty-seven such resolutions. Huma Khan, Immigration Debate: Number 
of City, State Bills Relating to Immigration Increase, ABC NEWS (Aug. 2, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
Politics/immigration-debate-number-city-state-bills-relating-immigration/story?id=11220316. 
18. See also infra notes 84–88 and accompanying text discussing how San Francisco Mayor 
Newsom worried publicly about the constitutionality of the city’s sanctuary ordinance—a concern 
that was partly fueled by advice he received from the city attorney’s office. 
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sanctuary ordinances and attack anti-immigrant proposals have it both ways 
constitutionally?  
In this Article I review the case law that specifically has involved the 
constitutionality of sanctuary polices and the relevant principles of preemption 
and states’ rights. That process necessarily forces some comparison with the legal 
challenges over local and state anti-immigrant laws. In my view, while the 
principles of federalism represented in the Supreme Court’s approach to the 
Tenth Amendment and preemption drive a stake in the heart of subfederal anti-
immigrant laws, those same principles guide us to the conclusion that sanctuary 
policies are on safe footing. That conclusion is consistent with notions of giving 
voice to the disenfranchised and those who are potentially persecuted by a 
majority voicing a popular view; we must protect the voiceless from being 
overwhelmed and stand guard against a majoritarian intolerance of minority 
groups. So in the immigration field, the concept of preemption is an appropriate 
check on overzealous subfederal enforcement efforts that directly affect 
immigration regulation, while the Tenth Amendment is a check on federal 
intrusion on a local jurisdiction’s attempt to be more protective of individual 
rights when the locality has a legitimate nonimmigration-related purpose, such as 
public safety. 
The discussion on the legality of sanctuary policies will reveal that the 
reserved police powers and local economic decisions under principles of 
federalism play a major part in the analysis. For that reason, a deeper 
understanding of the rationale for sanctuary policies is crucial. We will find that in 
jurisdictions with sanctuary policies, local policy makers and law enforcement 
officials have made thoughtful and deliberate public safety decisions, taking great 
pains to do the right thing for the entire community. Those decisions are critical 
to principles of inclusion in our ever-growing diverse communities. For that 
reason, the sanctuary framework is good public policy—especially in contrast to 
the anti-immigrant examples of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 or Hazleton, Pennsylvania. 
This Article attempts to provide an understanding of the rationale behind 
sanctuary policies as a necessary step in addressing constitutional and policy 
concerns. In Part II, I examine the background and descriptions of some of the 
sanctuary ordinances and policies that can be found across the country. Part III 
presents an analysis of the constitutionality of sanctuary policies primarily focusing 
on Tenth Amendment and preemption analysis. In Part IV, I present the record 
on why sanctuary policies are being advanced as an important ingredient to good 
policing in communities with immigrant neighborhoods. Part V extends this 
discussion to why sanctuary policies are good public policy, especially as an 
instrument to encourage civic integration. In my closing, I also refer to programs, 
such as state and local partnership agreements with Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) known as 287(g) agreements, the Secure Communities 
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program, and the National Crime Information Center database, that threaten to 
destroy public policy gains offered by sanctuary policies. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Like many cities and jurisdictions across the country in the 1980s, San 
Francisco declared itself a “city of refuge” or “sanctuary” city in response to the 
deportation of Central American refugees who had fled to the United States 
searching for protection from the civil conflicts that were raging in their 
countries.19 San Francisco’s 1985 resolution, passed by the city and county’s Board 
of Supervisors and signed by the mayor, was considered nonbinding, although its 
language stated that “federal employees, not City employees, should be considered 
responsible for implementation of immigration and refugee policy” and that city 
departments should not act in a manner toward Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
refugees that would “cause their deportation.”20 However, after two 1989 
incidents involving San Francisco police officers who cooperated with the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Salvadoran consul, the 
Board of Supervisors adopted an ordinance that specifically prohibited officials 
from asking about or disseminating an individual’s immigration status “unless 
required by federal or state law.”21 Now, presumably, the ordinance had teeth; San 
Francisco officials—including law enforcement officers—were not to inquire 
about individuals’ immigration status.  
The exception “unless specifically required” by state or federal law became 
relevant a few years later and is relevant today under preemption and Tenth 
Amendment scrutiny.22 In 1993, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors voted to 
amend the ordinance, permitting an exception for individuals arrested and booked 
on felonies. In 1990, Congress passed a law that required states receiving federal 
block grants for crime and drug control, such as California, to provide certified 
copies of state criminal conviction records to federal immigration authorities 
within thirty days of conviction.23 So, in 1992, the California Office of Criminal 
Justice Planning (OCJP), which was responsible for administering the federal 
block grant, played it safe and decided to require grant recipients, such as San 
Francisco, to report individuals to the INS upon arrest—even prior to 
 
19. Ignatius Bau, City of Refuge: No Federal Preemption of Ordinances Restricting Local Government 
Cooperation with the INS, 7 LA RAZA L.J. 50, 50–53 (1994). 
20. S.F. Bd. of Supervisors Res. 1087-85 (1985). 
21. Bau, supra note 19, at 53–54; see also S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12.H.2 (1989). 
22. Language in sanctuary policies that provide exceptions when federal authorities ask for 
immigration information that local authorities have helps to avoid preemption. See infra notes 180–83 
and accompanying text. 
23. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 507, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990). The next 
year, Congress amended the law to require simple notice of conviction in lieu of certified records, 
unless INS requested the certified records. Miscellaneous and Technical Immigration and 
Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-232, § 306(a)(6), 105 Stat. 1751 (1991). 
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conviction.24 With some dissent,25 San Francisco complied by amending the 
sanctuary ordinance and incorporating the exception for individuals arrested.26 
Thus, the state and San Francisco went beyond the federal requirement of 
reporting immigrants with convictions, and the new ordinance language required 
reporting of individuals simply upon arrest. However, outside of those 
circumstances, the ordinance required officers to refrain from asking individuals 
about immigration status. Ironically, the federal requirement that recipients of the 
block grants provide notice of criminal convictions subsequently was eliminated,27 
but San Francisco has never repealed its exception.  
The history of San Francisco’s ordinance suggests that the ordinance falls 
into a genre of policies that can be classified as expressions of “solidarity” with the 
Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s when thousands of refugees from El Salvador 
and Guatemala fled to the United States seeking refuge from civil strife.28 Most of 
the asylum seekers were denied relief under narrow interpretations of the asylum 
laws, so churches and synagogues protested the decisions by offering their places 
of worship to house and protect the migrants.29 Thus, cities like San Francisco 
stepped into the fray with their own sympathetic policies to make a statement in 
opposition to the limited grant of asylum by U.S. officials to the migrants.30 
Though it may be tempting to regard the current multitude of sanctuary 
policies as statements in opposition to federal immigration enforcement decisions, 
the public justification offered for the vast majority of such policies generally is 
presented in terms of public safety. The idea is that by seeking to create good 
relations and trust with immigrant communities, law enforcement is more 
effective for the entire community. In fact some immigrant rights advocates and 
law enforcement officials rail against the “sanctuary” terminology, arguing that the 
misnomer distracts the public from the real purpose of the policies to provide safe 
communities for all residents.31 They prefer “community policing,” 
“confidentiality,” or “preventive policing” labels.32 The LAPD policy, issued in 
 
24. See, e.g., Letter from Cal. Office of Criminal Justice Planning 1 (Sept. 29, 1993). 
25. The San Francisco Board of Supervisors voted six to four to amend the ordinance to 
comply with OCJP’s directive, in order to avoid the loss of federal funding. 
26. Bau, supra note 19, at 68–70. 
27. Violence Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-162, § 1111, 119 Stat. 2960 (2005). 
28. Bau, supra note 19, at 53–54. 
29. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 4. 
30. Bau, supra note 19, at 50–53. 
31. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 5. 
32. See Public Safety and Civil Rights Implications of State and Local Enforcement of Fed. Immigration 
Laws: J. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., & Int’l Law and the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 111th Cong. 
84 (2009) (testimony of George Gascón, Chief, Mesa Police Dep’t, Mesa, Ariz.); DAVID A. HARRIS, 
GOOD COPS: THE CASE FOR PREVENTIVE POLICING 14–25 (2005); NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, 
IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT BY STATE AND LOCAL POLICE 2–3 (2007); TRAMONTE, supra 
note 2, at 1. A Congressional Research Service report defines a “sanctuary city” this way: 
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1979, is cited as an early example of a community policy approach implemented 
prior to the influx of Central American refugees and the Sanctuary Movement.33 
The evolution of some relatively recent sanctuary policies makes clear that 
public safety is their main goal.34 In New Haven, Connecticut, in 2005, the police 
chief, government officials, and community leaders adopted two initiatives 
“designed to make New Haven more welcoming and safer for immigrants, and to 
help police officers during interactions with immigrants.”35 The police issued a 
general order outlining procedures for police to follow during encounters with 
immigrants, and the city began issuing identification cards to all city residents 
regardless of immigration status.36 New Haven’s population was close to a quarter 
Latino by 2007, and 10,000 to 15,000 residents were undocumented.37 According 
to New Haven police, immigrants are often the victims, rather than perpetrators, 
of crime. They are targets of street robberies and home invasions. The crimes 
committed by undocumented immigrants include disorderly conduct, public 
intoxication, and motor vehicle violations. Domestic violence was identified as an 
“ongoing problem” in immigrant communities.38 Under the police department’s 
general order, no distinction is made between documented and undocumented 
immigrants because they are all “part of our community.”39 In other words, the 
department “would rather solve a homicide than worry about” the immigration 
 
Most cities that are considered sanctuary cities have adopted a “don’t ask-don’t tell” policy 
where they don’t require their employees, including law enforcement officers, to report to 
federal officials aliens who may be illegally present in the country. 
Localities, and in some cases individual police departments, in such areas that are 
considered “sanctuary cities,” have utilized various mechanisms to ensure that 
unauthorized aliens who may be present in their jurisdiction illegally are not turned in to 
federal authorities. 
LISA M. SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32270, ENFORCING IMMIGRATION LAW: 
THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 26 (2006). 
33. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 4. 
34. On the other hand, the justification for the sanctuary policy in Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
first enacted in 1985 and renewed in 2006 suggests that it falls in the genre of statements of solidarity 
with immigrants who are victims of unjust U.S. immigration enforcement policies as laws: 
RESOLVED: That the City of Cambridge reaffirm its commitment as a Sanctuary City, as 
declared by City Council Order Number 4 of April 8, 1985; and be it further 
RESOLVED: That the City of Cambridge endorses the platform of the National Alliance 
of Latin American and Caribbean Communities’ Keep Our Families Together Campaign: 
 Create an opportunity to apply for legal permanent residency status. 
 Expedition of family visas. 
 Visionary program for future migration flows that respects the rights of immigrants 
as workers and as human beings. 
 The social, political and economic integration of new immigrants into US society . . . . 
CAMBRIDGE, MASS., CITY COUNCIL ORDER NO. 16 (May 8, 2006), available at 
http://www.rwinters.com/council/sanctuary2006.htm. 
35. HOFFMASTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 2. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. at 1. 
38. Id. at 4. 
39. Id. 
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status of a witness or victim.40 Officers are prohibited from asking crime victims, 
witnesses, and anyone who approaches an officer for assistance about immigration 
status.41 As a result of the policy and follow-up initiatives, cooperation with police 
has “increased dramatically” and important strides have been made in getting the 
community to overcome its “fear of the police.”42 
The process of forging what can loosely be labeled a sanctuary policy was 
quite different in Prince William County, Virginia.43 Between 2000 and 2007, the 
Latino population increased from just under ten percent to almost twenty percent 
of the total population.44 Violent crimes decreased, but burglary and larceny 
increased.45 Until 2007, as a matter of practice, police officers did not ask 
individuals about immigration status unless the person was arrested for a serious 
crime.46 During the summer of 2006, a series of robberies occurred in which 
Latinos—including some undocumented immigrants—were the primary victims.47 
Counterintuitively, this led to an immigrant backlash and criticism of the police 
chief, a forty-year veteran, for condoning a “sanctuary” policy for undocumented 
immigrants.48 The Board of County Supervisors (BOCS) reacted by adopting 
restrictions on social services for undocumented immigrants and ordering the 
police department to enter into a partnership with ICE to assist in federal 
immigration enforcement.49 These agreements are authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 
1357(g) or Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) section 287(g). The police chief 
cautioned that such a policy would discourage crime victims in immigrant 
communities from coming forward, harm the department’s relationship of trust 
with the community, and subject the county to allegations of racial profiling.50 
Within two months, the BOCS modified the order, partly from fear that racial 
profiling litigation would ensue, and only required immigration status questions 
 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 6. 
42. Id. at 7. 
43. The intense debate over the issue of immigration in Prince William County is the subject 
of a documentary film. 9500 LIBERTY (Interactive Democracy Alliance 2009). 
44. HOFFMASTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 14. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 14–15. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 14–18. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), DHS is authorized to enter into written 
agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies to delegate immigration enforcement 
functions to select local law enforcement officers. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., THE PERFORMANCE OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS: REPORT UPDATE 2 (Sept. 2010), 
available at http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_10-124_Sep10.pdf. The agreements outline 
terms and conditions under which participating local personnel will function as immigration officers. 
Id. Pursuant to these agreements, designated officers who receive appropriate training and function 
under the supervision of sworn ICE officers are permitted to perform immigration law enforcement 
duties. Id. 
50. HOFFMASTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 15. 
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for those placed under arrest. So the policy became one of postarrest, rather than 
prearrest inquiry, and every person taken into custody had to be asked about 
immigration status.51 
Around the same time and not far from Prince William County, Virginia, 
police officials in Montgomery County, Maryland also were reassessing their 
approach to encounters with immigrants. The police chief in Montgomery County 
was a thirty-year law enforcement veteran in the Washington, D.C. area.52 
Montgomery County experienced growth in the undocumented immigrant 
population beginning in 2005 and a simultaneous trend in increased crime in 
immigrant neighborhoods.53 When the police chief took the helm in 2004, he 
knew that local political leaders and the community were accepting of the 
undocumented population; officers generally “did not question individuals about 
their immigration status.”54 However, as the media began linking crime to 
undocumented immigrants, the police department’s policy was called into 
question.55 In formulating an official policy, the chief wanted an approach that 
would facilitate the apprehension of undocumented immigrant criminals. 
However, he also wanted to enable officers to maintain positive relationships with 
immigrant communities.56 After consulting with other law enforcement 
departments, the community, staff, and other residents, a new policy was adopted 
that requires the police only to forward to ICE the names of individuals arrested 
and charged with specified serious crimes.57 To prevent racial profiling, the name 
of every person arrested for those crimes is forwarded to ICE.58 
Arizona’s enactment of S.B. 1070 and the notoriety of Sheriff Joe Arpaio of 
Maricopa County (Phoenix metropolitan area) contribute to the state’s image as a 
hotbed for subfederal immigration enforcement. S.B. 1070 included a series of 
provisions that, among other things, made immigration enforcement a priority for 
local police and criminalized undocumented status under state statute. Arpaio’s 
zealous workplace immigration raids and traffic checkpoint sweeps made the 
county the largest participant in the 287(g) program, responsible for tens of 
thousands of deportations of immigrants.59 Any attempt to counter the state’s 
message of hostility and unwelcome toward undocumented immigrants would 
appear to be futile. However, at least two Arizona police departments have tried. 
The mayor of Phoenix has tried to counteract the anti-immigrant image that 
the state and county have developed. He accused Sheriff Arpaio of racial profiling 
 
51. Id. at 18. 
52. Id. at 20. 
53. Id. at 21. 
54. Id. at 20–21. 
55. Id. at 21. 
56. Id. at 21–22. 
57. Id. at 22. 
58. Id. at 23. 
59. Id. at 29. 
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and asked the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to investigate Arpaio for allegedly 
violating the constitutional rights of immigrants.60 Moreover, a local think tank 
concluded that Arpaio’s tactics have actually resulted in increased crime, fewer 
arrests on criminal matters, and slower 911 responses.61 In contrast to Arpaio, the 
Phoenix Police Department prefers to focus on serious, violent crime when it 
comes to undocumented immigrants, and prior to a 2007 killing of a police officer 
by an undocumented immigrant, the department’s policy prohibited officers from 
contacting federal immigration officials.62 After the shooting, the mayor proposed 
a revision to the policy, and now every person arrested is asked about citizenship 
status.63 If an officer suspects that the individual is undocumented and a 
supervisor approves, federal ICE officials are contacted.64 However, officers are 
prohibited from asking crime victims and witnesses about immigration status.65 
Traffic stops and other noncriminal encounters can result in a call to ICE if the 
officer suspects the person is undocumented.66 The new policy is credited with 
contributing to a significant decrease in property and violent crimes.67 
Another Maricopa County city, Mesa, has experienced a drop in crime 
because of police department policy changes, even though critics label the changes 
a “sanctuary policy.”68 The Mesa police chief and mayor were critical of Sheriff 
Arpaio’s tactics that were viewed as undermining the police department’s 
“relationship with the immigrant community.”69 Arpaio’s sweeps forced residents 
to stay indoors and discouraged children from attending school, damaging the 
department’s “efforts to build trust.”70 Police were concerned that undocumented 
immigrants were preying on other Latinos who were hesitant to report crimes out 
of fear of deportation.71 A new police chief, who took over the position in 2006, 
 
60. Id. at 30. In March 2009, the DOJ launched a civil rights investigation of the sheriff’s 
enforcement of federal immigration laws to determine whether deputies were engaging in “patterns or 
practices of discriminatory police practices and unconstitutional searches and seizures.” Id. at 40. 
Later, in September 2010, the DOJ filed a lawsuit against the sheriff, his office, and the county for 
refusing full cooperation with the department’s investigation. Id. Since 2007, the sheriff’s office was 
responsible for nearly one-fourth of the nationwide total of deportations over a three-year period 
through its 287(g) program. Id. at 29. In October 2009, ICE declined to renew the portion of the 
county’s 287(g) contract that allowed deputies to arrest immigration violators during patrols; however, 
the sheriff’s office retained its authority to check the immigration status of all inmates booked into 
county jails. Id. 
61. Id. at 31. 
62. Id. at 31–32. 




67. Id. at 31. 
68. Id. at 38. 
69. Id. at 39. 
70. Id. at 39 (quoting a district commander from the Mesa Police Department). 
71. Id. at 39–40. 
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sensed suspicion and mistrust between the police and the immigrant community.72 
By 2009, the chief and the mayor forged a city policy that sought to “build public 
confidence in the police and trust with the communities served.”73 Under the 
policy, the immigration status of persons arrested for criminal offenses is assessed. 
However, officers are not to ask about the immigration status of crime victims 
and witnesses, nor of anyone involved in minor misdemeanors or civil infractions, 
including traffic stops.74  
New York City’s policy evolved on the heels of the sanctuary movement on 
behalf of Central Americans. While the public trust and confidence argument is 
certainly advanced to justify the policy today, there is no doubt that New York 
City mayors—including current mayor Michael Bloomberg—have a very long and 
consistent proimmigrant worldview. Essentially, the city prohibits its employees 
from voluntarily providing federal immigration authorities with information 
concerning the immigration status of any alien. In August 1989, Edward Koch, 
then New York City’s mayor, issued Executive Order No. 124. The Order 
prohibited any city officer or employee from transmitting information regarding 
the immigration status of any individual to federal immigration authorities unless 
(i) such employee’s agency is required by law to disclose such information, (ii) an 
alien explicitly authorizes a city agency to verify his or her immigration status, or 
(iii) an alien is suspected by a city agency of engaging in criminal behavior.75 
 
72. Id. at 40. 
73. Id. at 43. 
74. Id. 
75. Executive Order 124 provides in pertinent part: 
Section 2. Confidentiality of Information Respecting Aliens. 
a. No City officer or employee shall transmit information respecting any alien to 
federal immigration authorities unless 
(1) Such officer’s or employee’s agency is required by law to disclose information 
respecting such alien, or 
(2) such agency has been authorized, in writing signed by such alien, to verify such 
alien’s immigration status, or 
(3) such alien is suspected by such agency of engaging in criminal activity, including 
an attempt to obtain public assistance benefits through the use of fraudulent documents. 
b. Each agency shall designate one or more officers or employees who shall be 
responsible for receiving reports from such agency’s line workers on aliens suspected of 
criminal activity and for determining, on a case by case basis, what action, if any, to take on 
such reports. No such determination shall be made by any line worker, nor shall any line 
worker transmit information respecting any alien directly to federal immigration 
authorities. 
c. Enforcement agencies, including the Police Department and the Department of 
Correction, shall continue to cooperate with federal authorities in investigating and 
apprehending aliens suspected of criminal activity. However, such agencies shall not 
transmit to federal authorities information respecting any alien who is the victim of a 
crime. 
Section 3. Availability of City Services to Aliens. 
Any service provided by a City agency shall be made available to all aliens who are 
otherwise eligible for such service unless such agency is required by law to deny eligibility 
for such service to aliens. Every City agency shall encourage aliens to make use of those 
services provided by such agency for which aliens are not denied eligible by laws. 
City Policy Concerning Aliens, New York City Executive Order No. 124 (Aug. 7, 1989). 
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However, even if a city agency’s line workers suspect an alien of criminal activity, 
the Executive Order prohibits them from transmitting information regarding such 
alien directly to the federal authorities.76 Instead, it requires each agency to 
designate certain officers or employees to receive reports on suspected criminal 
activity from line workers and to determine on a case-by-case basis what action, if 
any, to take on such reports.77 Mayor Koch’s successors, David Dinkins and 
Rudolph Giuliani, reissued the Executive Order. 
As noted previously, Los Angeles’ 1979 police department policy predates 
the Central American-focused Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s. Special Order 
40 (S.O. 40), entitled “Undocumented Aliens,” LAPD’s sanctuary policy, has been 
in place since November 27, 1979.78 The order restrains police officers from 
engaging in action when the only purpose is to inquire about immigration status 
and arresting the person for entering the country illegally. In other words, officers 
are instructed not to enforce immigration violations that they are not witnessing.79 
On the other hand, when a person is arrested for more than one misdemeanor 
offense or something more serious, the arresting officers do have to notify a 
superior if the arrested person is determined to be undocumented. S.O. 40 was 
implemented to gain the trust of the immigrant community in an effort to 




78. Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 724 (Ct. App. 2009). Prior to 1979, 
Special Order No. 68 and its Supplemental Fact Sheet, dated November 24, 1972, 
embodied LAPD policy regarding arrest for illegal entry into this country. 
According to this directive, officers were not to initiate police action with the 
primary objective of discovering the alien status of a person where no crime-related issues 
were involved. 
Whether or not a suspected undocumented alien was booked on criminal charges, 
the arresting officer was to contact by phone an immigration agent who would then 
interview the detainee to “determine the legality of the suspected person’s presence in the 
United States.” INS could place a teletype “hold” on the suspect which became effective 
after adjudication of any state criminal matter. 
Where the detained person was not booked on a criminal charge and contact with 
the INS revealed undocumented status, the LAPD policy required an officer to consult 
divisional detectives or the watch commander for booking approval. Such approval might 
be obtained where “there is a likelihood that the release of an illegal alien will create 
additional police problems. (Example: Family dispute calls, possibility of an assault or 
ADW occurring, etc.)” If booking approval was denied, the suspect was to be released but 
the officer was to forward all available information as to the suspect’s identity to Detective 
Headquarters Division (DHD). 
With respect to suspected illegal aliens who were neither the object of a police 
investigation nor subject to booking, an officer “need not notify INS” but instead could 
merely forward information on the suspect to DHD. However, in urgent situations, such 
as fires or other disasters in which a suspected illegal alien was a victim or involved, an 
officer could notify DHD, which, in turn, would notify INS “who will take immediate 
action to aid this Department in alleviating the problem.” 
Gates v. Superior Court, 238 Cal. Rptr. 592, 595 (Ct. App. 1987). S.O. 40 was enacted to replace 
Special Order No. 68. 
79. Sturgeon, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 725. 
80. See Mariel Garza, Bratton: Special Order 40 Not Going Anywhere, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 14, 
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Even in San Francisco today, public officials who support the city’s 
sanctuary ordinance tout its public safety purpose. In explaining his support, one 
member of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors explained,  
If you are the victim of a crime and an undocumented person was the 
witness to that crime, you want that undocumented person to come 
forward and report what they saw to the police. . . . They’re not going to 
come forward if they’re afraid the police will report them to 
immigration.81  
The idea is that the policy shielding immigrants from deportation benefits other 
San Franciscans as well.82 Language in San Francisco’s ordinance makes clear that 
actions of local authorities are not to “be construed or implemented so as to 
discourage any person, regardless of immigration status, from reporting criminal 
activity to law enforcement agencies.”83 
All of these examples reveal that while some local lawmakers and police 
officials may be motivated by sympathy for undocumented immigrants, the stated 
rationale behind the sanctuary or “don’t ask” policies with respect to witnesses, 
victims, and low-level criminal arrests is public safety. The idea is that gaining the 
trust of all parts of the community is important to keeping the entire community 
safe. 
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY 
The question of whether sanctuary policies of police departments and local 
jurisdictions are constitutional has been raised in some interesting circumstances. 
For example, San Francisco’s ordinance received special attention in 2008 
following accusations that twenty-two-year-old Edwin Ramos committed a triple 
homicide. It seems that at the age of thirteen, the Salvadoran-born Ramos had 
served time in San Francisco Juvenile Hall for two felonies and was never 
deported. Ramos should have been reported to immigration officials under the 
policy at the time but he fell through the cracks. In what critics regard as an 
overreaction, Gavin Newsom, the mayor at the time, ordered juvenile probation 
authorities to treat arrested juveniles prior to conviction the same as arrested 
adults under the 1993 amendment.84 Prior to Newsom’s order, only arrested (but 
not yet convicted) adults were reported to immigration authorities. The new order 
 
2008, available at http://www.insidesocal.com/friendlyfire/2008/04/bratton-special-order-40-not-
g.html; In the Real World: The Myths Surrounding the LAPD’s Special Order 40 May Hinder Action on 
Criminal Deportations, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2008, at A16, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/ 
apr/09/opinion/ed-gangs9. 
81. Richard Gonzales, San Francisco Youth Sanctuary Law Prompts Battle, NPR ALL THINGS 
CONSIDERED (Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://www.wbur.org/npr/120061381/san-francisco-youth-
sanctuary-law-prompts-battle (quoting Supervisor David Campos). 
82. Id. 
83. See infra note 85 (text of the ordinance). 
84. See infra notes 85–88 and accompanying text. 
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required arrested juveniles to be reported to ICE before conviction as well, even if 
charges were later dropped. Many members of the San Francisco Board of 
Supervisors bristled at the policy shift, arguing that reporting juveniles prior to any 
conviction was a stunning setback to sanctuary principles because juveniles are 
much different from adults under conventional norms of public policy. Within a 
year, the Board, over Newsom’s veto, passed legislation that permits reporting of 
juveniles to ICE only upon a finding by the juvenile court that the minor 
committed a felony or if the juvenile is treated as an adult by the superior court.85 
 
85. Maria L. La Ganga, S.F. Overrides Sanctuary Veto, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2009, at A3. San 
Francisco’s ordinance currently reads as follows: 
Sec. 12H.2. Use of City Funds Prohibited. 
No department, agency, commission, officer or employee of the City and County of 
San Francisco shall use any City funds or resources to assist in the enforcement of Federal 
immigration law or to gather or disseminate information regarding the immigration status 
of individuals in the City and County of San Francisco unless such assistance is required by 
Federal or State statute, regulation or court decision. The prohibition set forth in this 
Chapter shall include, but shall not be limited to: 
(a) Assisting or cooperating, in one’s official capacity, with any investigation, 
detention, or arrest procedures, public or clandestine, conducted by the Federal agency 
charged with enforcement of the federal immigration law and relating to alleged violations 
of the civil provisions of the Federal immigration law. 
. . . . 
(c) Requesting information about, or disseminating information regarding, the 
immigration status of any individual, or conditioning the provision of services or benefits 
by the City and County of San Francisco upon immigration status, except as required by 
Federal or State statute or regulation, City and County public assistance criteria, or court 
decision. 
(d) Including on any application, questionnaire or interview form used in relation to 
benefits, services or opportunities provided by the City and County of San Francisco any 
question regarding immigration status other than those required by Federal or State statute, 
regulation or court decision. Any such questions existing or being used by the City and 
County at the time this Chapter is adopted shall be deleted within sixty days of the 
adoption of this Chapter. 
Sec. 12H.2-1. Chapter Provisions Inapplicable to Persons Convicted of Certain 
Crimes. 
Nothing in this Chapter shall prohibit, or be construed as prohibiting, a Law 
Enforcement Officer from identifying and reporting any adult pursuant to State or Federal 
law or regulation who is in custody after being booked for the alleged commission of a 
felony and is suspected of violating the civil provisions of the immigration laws. In 
addition, nothing in this Chapter shall prohibit, or be construed as prohibiting, a Law 
Enforcement Officer from identifying and reporting any juvenile who is suspected of 
violating the civil provisions of the immigration laws if: (1) . . . (2) the San Francisco 
Superior Court makes a finding of probable cause after the District Attorney directly files 
felony criminal charges against the minor in adult criminal court; or (3) the San Francisco 
Superior Court determines that the minor is unfit to be tried in juvenile court, the minor is 
certified to adult criminal court, and the Superior Court makes a finding of probable cause 
in adult criminal court. 
Nothing in this Chapter shall preclude any City and County department, agency, 
commission, officer or employee from (a) reporting information to the Federal agency 
charged with enforcement of the Federal immigration law regarding an individual who has 
been booked at any county jail facility, and who has previously been convicted of a felony 
committed in violation of the laws of the State of California, which is still considered a 
felony under State law; (b) cooperating with a request from the Federal agency charged 
with enforcement of Federal immigration law for information regarding an individual who 
has been convicted of a felony committed in violation of the laws of the State of 
California, which is still considered a felony under State law; or (c) reporting information as 
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Interestingly, the controversy placed a spotlight on the general 
constitutionality of San Francisco’s entire sanctuary ordinance. In response to the 
Board’s override of the Mayor’s veto, the San Francisco City Attorney’s office 
warned that the action was “likely to result in a federal legal challenge to the [new 
legislation] and possibly the entire City of Refuge Ordinance.”86 In his veto 
message, the Mayor argued that the “sanctuary ordinance as originally 
conceived . . . was designed to protect those residents . . . who are law abiding. It 
was never meant to serve as a shield for people accused of committing serious 
crimes . . . . [The] changes [adopted by the Board of Supervisors] threaten the very 
existence of our sanctuary ordinance.”87 Newsom’s spokesman announced to the 
press that the supervisors’ vote could invite a federal legal challenge to the city’s 
entire sanctuary policy.88 
Implicit in these expressions of caution that San Francisco’s entire sanctuary 
ordinance may be subject to challenge is a fear that somehow the policy conflicts 
with or is in violation of federal law. The caution is particularly interesting in 
today’s political environment because state and local anti-immigrant laws, such as 
those enacted in Arizona, Alabama, Utah, Mississippi, and the cities of Hazleton, 
Pennsylvania, and Farmers Branch, Texas, have been challenged on the grounds 
that they conflict with federal immigration laws. The proimmigrant position in the 
later situations is that only the federal government has the authority to regulate 
immigrants. The intriguing question is whether that position is consistent with the 
proimmigrant position that a sanctuary ordinance, such as San Francisco’s, is 
 
required by Federal or State statute, regulation or court decision, regarding an individual 
who has been convicted of a felony committed in violation of the laws of the State of 
California, which is still considered a felony under State law. For purposes of this Section, 
an individual has been “convicted” of a felony when: (a) there has been a conviction by a 
court of competent jurisdiction; and (b) all direct appeal rights have been exhausted or 
waived; or (c) the appeal period has lapsed. 
However, no officer, employee or law enforcement agency of the City and County of 
San Francisco shall stop, question, arrest or detain any individual solely because of the 
individual’s national origin or immigration status. In addition, in deciding whether to 
report an individual to the Federal agency charged with enforcement of the Federal 
immigration law under the circumstances described in this Section, an officer, employee or 
law enforcement agency of the City and County of San Francisco shall not discriminate 
among individuals on the basis of their ability to speak English or perceived or actual 
national origin. 
. . . . 
Nothing herein shall be construed or implemented so as to discourage any person, 
regardless of immigration status, from reporting criminal activity to law enforcement 
agencies. 
S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE §§ 12.H.2 to 12.H.2-1 (1993). 
86. Legal Issues in Connection with Proposed Amendment to Sanctuary Ordinance, 
Memorandum from Buck Delventhal, Miriam Morley & Wayne Snodgrass, Deputy City Att’ys of S.F., 
to Mayor Gavin Newsom (Aug. 18, 2009). 
87. Letter from Mayor Gavin Newsom to Angela Calvillo, Clerk of the Bd. of Supervisors 
(Oct. 28, 2009) (on file with author). 
88. Jesse McKinley, San Francisco to Delay Reports on Charges Against Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 20, 2009, at A19. 
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constitutional and does not contravene the principle that only the federal 
government has the authority to regulate immigrants. 
In this Section, I analyze these constitutional questions. First, I review the 
approaches that two courts have used in reviewing sanctuary policies in two 
different contexts to provide a starting point. One involves New York City’s 
ordinance in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the 
city’s Tenth Amendment challenge to federal statutes that appeared to disrupt the 
protections afforded by the ordinance. The other is a California court of appeal 
decision in favor of the LAPD’s special order that had been challenged on 
preemption grounds. With those cases as a background, I look closer at the federal 
statutes that set their sights on sanctuary ordinances and conclude that the federal 
provisions have serious Tenth Amendment problems. Since sanctuary policies 
primarily are enacted for public safety purposes, federal policies that intrude on 
those goals face serious problems. Although most cities with such policies do not 
restrain officers from voluntarily providing information to ICE out of fear that 
such a restraint would violate the federal law, I believe that fear is unwarranted. If 
the federal law mandates cooperation, serious commandeering problems arise 
under the Tenth Amendment. However, assuming that the federal statutes survive 
Tenth Amendment scrutiny, I then address the question of whether sanctuary laws 
are preempted under the Supremacy Clause. I conclude that sanctuary policies that 
bar local officials from asking crime victims and witnesses about immigration 
status are not susceptible to preemption claims (field, implied, or conflict). 
Sanctuary laws are about public safety and how to prioritize the spending of public 
funds, not about regulating immigration. 
A. City of New York v. United States 
The City of New York directly challenged the constitutionality of two federal 
antisanctuary laws—8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644—in the context of the city’s own 
sanctuary ordinance in City of New York v. United States.89 The city argued that the 
federal laws violated the Tenth Amendment, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit disagreed.  
Sections 1373 and 1644, which have similar language, are from parts of two 
pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in 1996. The Welfare Reform Act, signed 
into law by President Clinton in August 1996, contained a provision (section 434), 
entitled “Communication between State and Local Government Agencies and the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service,” which became 8 U.S.C. § 1644 and 
reads, 
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, no 
State or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way 
restricted, from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and 
 
89. 179 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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Naturalization Service information regarding the immigration status, 
lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the United States.  
The Conference Report accompanying the bill made clear that the purpose 
was to encourage communication from subfederal officials to federal officials: 
The conferees intend to give State and local officials the authority to 
communicate with the INS regarding the presence, whereabouts, or 
activities of illegal aliens. . . . The conferees believe that immigration law 
enforcement is as high a priority as other aspects of Federal law 
enforcement, and that illegal aliens do not have the right to remain in the 
United States undetected and unapprehended.90 
Then in September 1996, Clinton signed an immigration reform law that 
contained a provision (section 642) entitled “Communication between 
Government Agencies and the Immigration and Naturalization Service,” which 
essentially expanded on § 1644 and became § 1373: 
(a) In General  
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, 
a Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, 
or in any way restrict, any government entity or official from sending to, 
or receiving from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or 
unlawful, of any individual.  
(b) Additional Authority of Government Entities  
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, 
no person or agency may prohibit, or in any way restrict, a Federal, State, 
or local government entity from doing any of the following with respect 
to information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of 
any individual:  
(1) Sending such information to, or requesting or receiving 
such information from, the Immigration and Naturalization Service.  
(2) Maintaining such information.  
(3) Exchanging such information with any other Federal, State, 
or local government entity.  
(c) Obligation to Respond to Inquiries  
The Immigration and Naturalization Service shall respond to an 
inquiry by a Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify 
or ascertain the citizenship or immigration status of any individual within 
the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose authorized by law, by 
providing the requested verification or status information. 91  
 
90. H.R. REP. NO. 104-725, at 383 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2771. 
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2006); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 642, 110 Stat. 3009-707 (1996). 
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A Senate committee report accompanying this legislation explained that the 
purpose of the law was to acquire and “exchange . . . immigration-related 
information by State and local agencies” pertaining to the regulation of 
immigration.92  
After the enactment of these laws, the City of New York became concerned 
that §§ 1373 and 1644 would jeopardize its sanctuary policy described above.93 
Although no city officials claimed that the city had restrained them from 
communicating with immigration officials, shortly after the laws went into effect, 
the city sought declaratory and injunctive relief, asserting that the federal laws did 
not invalidate the city’s Executive Order. The city complained that because 
§§ 1373 and 1644 were aimed at state and local government entities, the laws 
violated the Tenth Amendment. In essence, the city argued that Congress could 
not restrict subfederal entities from controlling any immigration status 
information they obtained as they saw fit. The city asserted that the federal law 
was interfering with control of its own employees.94  
The Second Circuit divided the city’s Tenth Amendment arguments into two 
parts: (1) a state sovereignty claim that included the power to choose not to 
participate in federal regulatory programs and to stop local officials from 
participating even on a voluntary basis; and (2) a claim that the federal government 
cannot act in a manner that disrupts the actual operation of state and local 
government, such as by dictating the use of state and local resources or duties of 
local officials.95 The city relied on Printz v. United States (federal gun control) and 
New York v. United States (radioactive waste legislation), both Tenth Amendment 
cases,96 to support its claim that states have a choice about participating in federal 
regulatory programs and that the choice includes the ability to bar voluntary 
cooperation by local officials.97 
The Second Circuit did not agree with the city’s interpretation of Tenth 
Amendment case law. The court was cognizant of the Tenth Amendment’s 
language that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States . . . are reserved to 
the States,” and the court acknowledged that “however plenary Congress’s power 
to legislate in a particular area may be, the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress 
from commanding states to administer a federal regulatory program in that area. 
Moreover, ‘Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the 
State’s officers directly.’”98 However, the court thought that §§ 1373 and 1644 
were different. In Printz and New York, Congress improperly forced states to enact 
 
92. S. REP. NO. 104-249, at 19–20 (1996). 
93. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text. 
94. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 33. 
95. Id. at 34. 
96. Both cases are discussed more fully below. See infra notes 162–71 and accompanying text. 
97. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 34. 
98. Id. at 33–34 (citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997)). 
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or administer federal regulatory programs.99  
The central teaching of these cases is that “even where Congress has the 
authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, 
it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those 
acts.”100 Congress may not, therefore, directly compel states or localities to enact 
or to administer policies or programs adopted by the federal government. It may 
not directly shift to the states enforcement and administrative responsibilities 
allocated to the federal government by the Constitution.101  
However, in the case of §§ 1373 and 1664, Congress was, in the Second 
Circuit’s view, neither forcing subfederal entities to enact or administer a federal 
program nor conscripting local officials to do federal work. The federal laws 
simply prevented subfederal rule makers from “directly restricting the voluntary 
exchange of immigration information” with the immigration officials.102 
Based on its reading of the Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, the Second 
Circuit found the city’s rule problematic. By prohibiting any city officer or 
employee from transmitting information regarding the immigration status of any 
individual to federal immigration authorities, the executive order constituted a 
mandatory noncooperation directive to even those workers who might want to 
cooperate voluntarily. That directive was sufficient to forfeit the Tenth 
Amendment protections as outlined in Printz and New York.103 
The city also argued that the federal law violated the Tenth Amendment 
because §§ 1373 and 1644 interfered with the city’s operations by regulating 
confidential information obtained in the course of official business and seeking to 
control the actions of city officials. In support of this argument, the city pointed 
to Printz, where the Supreme Court also was critical of Congress for requiring 
local police officers to report privately obtained “information that belongs to the 
State and is available to them only in their official capacity,” as part of the Brady 
bill.104 The city argued that §§ 1373 and 1644 would improperly take control of its 
information, and that would violate its power to “determine the duties and 
responsibilities” of its own employees.105  
Although the Second Circuit acknowledged the federal policy’s interference 
 
99. Id. at 34. In Printz, local law enforcement had to conduct background checks for gun 
purchases, while in New York, state officials had to enact nuclear waste disposal rules and take title of 
anything that was not properly disposed of. See infra notes 169–71 and accompanying text. 
100. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (citations omitted). 
101. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 34. 
102. Id. at 35. 
103. Id. After the City of New York case, the executive order in New York was changed to 
make clear that immigration status is a proper subject of inquiry when required by federal officials, 
and voluntary cooperation by local officials is not barred if they have that information. See City Policy 
Concerning Immigrant Access to City Services, New York City Executive Order No. 34 (May 13, 
2003), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/eo/eo_34.pdf. 
104. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 36 (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at 933 n.17) (emphasis omitted). 
105. Id. 
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with “the City’s control over confidential information obtained in the course of 
municipal business,” the court did not regard this as an “impermissible intrusion” 
on the city’s authority.106 The only policy cited by the city that was disrupted was 
the sanctuary executive order that “single[d] out a particular federal policy for 
non-cooperation.”107 The city’s order did not prevent voluntary sharing of 
immigration information with nonfederal immigration agents, suggesting to the 
court that the Executive Order was not very “integral” to local government 
operations.108  
The Second Circuit’s analysis definitely leaves room for subfederal sanctuary-
style approaches in spite of §§ 1373 and 1644. Voluntary cooperation with ICE by 
local officials cannot be thwarted by sanctuary rules according to the Second 
Circuit.109 However, this assumes that local officials have information to share, 
and the City of New York decision did not address the policy of instructing local 
police to not ask about immigration status. Additionally, if the confidentiality 
policy on immigration status is one that applies generally and is not exclusively 
aimed at ICE, then the situation is quite different. Finally, nothing in the Second 
Circuit’s opinion suggests that Congress or federal officials could force local 
officials to gather immigration information about crime victims, crime witnesses, 
or for that matter, arrestees.  
As noted below, the Second Circuit’s interpretation of the Tenth 
Amendment vis-à-vis New York City’s sanctuary policies also is subject to 
criticism. The Second Circuit viewed §§ 1373 and 1644 as prohibitions from 
restricting voluntary cooperation with immigration officials.110 However, if the 
statutes are interpreted as a mandate to permit voluntary cooperation, then there 
may in fact be a Tenth Amendment problem.111 
B. Sturgeon v. Bratton 
In Sturgeon v. Bratton,112 Judicial Watch filed a taxpayer lawsuit, on behalf of 
Harold Sturgeon, against the LAPD in an attempt to put a stop to S.O. 40, the 
department’s sanctuary policy that had been in place since 1979.113 Judicial Watch 
is a conservative, educational foundation that boasts as one of its special projects 
 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 37. 
108. Id. As I argue below, I believe that the city’s argument for not asking about immigration 
status—at least as far as crime victims and witnesses, and even minor offenders—is a good one in 
terms of invoking the Tenth Amendment when the goal is public safety for everyone through gaining 
the trust of immigrant communities. See infra notes 180–83 and accompanying text. 
109. City of New York, 179 F.3d at 34–37. 
110. Id. at 34–35. 
111. See infra notes 146, 180 and accompanying text. 
112. 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718 (Ct. App. 2009). 
113. Id. at 724; see also Tom Fitton, You Can’t Trust ACLU, JUDICIAL WATCH (Jan. 8, 2010), 
http://www.judicialwatch.org/weeklyupdate/2010/01-you-cant-trust-aclu. 
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the removal of undocumented immigrants.114 The action against the police chief 
and others sought to enjoin enforcement of S.O. 40, the policy governing the 
police department’s interaction with undocumented immigrants.  
S.O. 40 bars LAPD officers from engaging in action when the sole purpose 
is determining the immigration status of a suspect and arresting such persons for 
the federal crime of illegally entering the United States. Stated broadly, S.O. 40 
prevents LAPD officers from initiating investigations for the purpose of finding 
violations of civil immigration laws and from arresting a suspect for an 
immigration misdemeanor not committed in the officers’ presence.115 In an earlier 
1987 case, the California Court of Appeal upheld S.O. 40 against a challenge that 
the “mere questioning of a criminal arrestee about his immigration status” and 
forwarding the information to the INS amounted to unconstitutional state 
enforcement of federal civil immigration law.116 That court found that the U.S. 
Constitution did not prevent the LAPD from voluntarily transferring arrest 
information to federal authorities.117 Under S.O. 40, “undocumented alien status 
in itself is not a matter for police action,” and S.O. 40 directs officers not to 
“initiate police action with the objective of discovering the alien status of a 
person.” However, “[w]hen an undocumented alien is booked for multiple 
misdemeanor offenses, a high grade misdemeanor or a felony offense, or has been 
previously arrested for a similar offense,” the arresting officer shall notify 
Detective Headquarters Division of the arrest which, in turn, relays the 
information to immigration officials.118  
Subsequently in 1996, as noted above, Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1373, 
aimed at invalidating subfederal attempts to restrict local officials from voluntarily 
providing immigration information to federal immigration officials.119 In Sturgeon v. 
Bratton, the plaintiff Sturgeon argued that S.O. 40, as a local restriction, was 
 
114. See Our Programs, JUDICIAL WATCH, http://www.judicialwatch.org/programs (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2011). 
115. Sturgeon, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 725. 
[S.O.] 40 was promulgated by then Chief of Police Daryl Gates on November 27, 1979. 
Special orders are directives issued by the chief of police which amend the LAPD Manual. 
Although the parties and apparently, members of the community continue to refer to the 
LAPD’s policy regarding illegal immigrants as “SO40,” the relevant provision is in the 
LAPD Manual with a different section number. Volume IV, section 264.50 of the LAPD 
Manual provides, “ENFORCEMENT OF UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION LAWS. 
Officers shall not initiate police action where the objective is to discover the alien status of 
a person. Officers shall neither arrest nor book persons for violation of Title 8, Section 
1325 of the United States Immigration Code (Illegal Entry).” 
Id. at 724–25. 
116. Gates v. Superior Court, 238 Cal. Rptr. 592, 600 (Ct. App. 1987). 
117. Id. Gates involved a challenge to LAPD procedures before and after S.O. 40, by 
individuals encountered by LAPD prior to S.O. 40. The court of appeals concluded that the prior 
procedures were flawed. 
118. Id. at 595. 
119. 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (2006). The background to § 1373 is set forth in the discussion of City of 
New York v. United States. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
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invalidated by § 1373. Namely, the plaintiff took the position that S.O. 40 violated 
the Supremacy Clause because S.O. 40 conflicted with § 1373. Sturgeon also 
argued that federal immigration law preempted S.O. 40.120  
In turning down the challenge, the state court of appeals began by noting 
that “[u]nder federal law, matters of immigration are handled by [ICE], a branch 
of the Department of Homeland Security.”121 Although the Attorney General of 
the United States may enter into a 287(g) agreement with local officials to help 
carry out the function of immigration officers, this requires a voluntary agreement, 
and the local officers would be subject to the supervision of federal officers.122 
Although the Attorney General has the authority to use local law enforcement 
officers to help respond in an emergency in dealing with a mass influx of aliens, 
the Attorney General can only act “with the consent of the head of the 
department, agency, or establishment under whose jurisdiction the individual is 
serving” in those circumstances.123  
While the Sturgeon court did not rule on whether § 1373 violated the Tenth 
Amendment, the court noted that the Tenth Amendment “shields state and local 
governments from the federal government requiring them to administer federal 
civil immigration law.”124 Although state law permits local police to enforce 
federal criminal statutes,125 as a practical matter California police likely would 
never make an arrest for misdemeanor illegal entry because California officers may 
arrest for a misdemeanor only committed in the officer’s presence.126  
Turning to the plaintiff’s Supremacy Clause and preemption claims, the 
Sturgeon court also considered the language of § 1373(a) that prohibits local 
authorities from stopping local officers from voluntarily cooperating with ICE.127 
Section 1373(b) goes on to provide that no person or agency may prohibit or 
restrict a local entity from “(1) sending such information to, or requesting and 
receiving such information from, [ICE;] (2) maintaining such information[;] or (3) 
exchanging such information with any other . . . government entity.”128 Finally, § 
1373(c) requires ICE to respond to any inquiry by a federal, state, or local 
government agency “seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or immigration 
status of any individual within the jurisdiction of the agency for any purpose 
 
120. Sturgeon, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 723. 
121. Id. 
122. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(3) (2006). 
123. Id. § 1103(a)(10). 
124. Sturgeon, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 724. The court’s approach appeared to assume that 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1373 was constitutional. 
125. Gates v. Superior Court, 238 Cal. Rptr. 592, 597–98 (Ct. App. 1987). 
126. CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(a) (West 2010). 
127. 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a). 
128. Id. § 1373(b). 
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authorized by law, by providing the requested verification or status 
information.”129  
In attempting to establish that S.O. 40 violates § 1373, the plaintiff took the 
depositions of high-ranking LAPD officers (past and present), presumably in the 
hopes of learning how S.O. 40 may have prohibited individual officer action that 
violated § 1373. However, the plaintiff learned of no specific instance where S.O. 
40 was applied. The plaintiff did not produce any evidence of individuals who had 
been prohibited by S.O. 40 from sending to ICE officials information regarding 
the immigration status of an individual, evidence of “individuals prohibited by 
S.O. 40 from receiving information from immigration officials, maintaining 
immigration information, and exchanging immigration information with any law 
enforcement agency,” nor evidence of any officers who “complained about the 
prohibitions” of S.O. 40.130  
The plaintiff argued that S.O. 40 violated the Supremacy Clause simply 
because S.O. 40 was impermissible under § 1373. To succeed with this facial 
challenge, the court ruled that Sturgeon had to “establish that S.O. 40’s provisions 
inevitably posed a present total and fatal conflict with section 1373”;131 a 
hypothetical conflict would not suffice. So the court looked closely at the language 
of the order and the federal statute. The text of S.O. 40 provides: “Officers shall 
not initiate police action where the objective is to discover the alien status of a 
person. Officers shall neither arrest nor book persons for violation of Title 8, 
Section 1325 of the United States Immigration Code (Illegal Entry).” On the other 
hand, § 1373(a) simply does not allow local officials from prohibiting local officers 
from voluntarily communicating with ICE. In the court’s opinion, the language of 
these provisions demonstrated no “total and fatal conflict.”132  
In the court’s assessment, S.O. 40 simply does not address communication 
with ICE which is the subject of § 1373; S.O. 40 addresses the initiation of police 
action and arrests for unauthorized entry. On the other hand, § 1373(a) does not 
address the initiation of police action or arrests for unauthorized entry; it 
addresses only communication with ICE. In other words, S.O. 40 bars the 
initiation of police action solely to discover immigration status, what might be 
characterized as a “don’t ask” policy. However, if local officials are aware of 
immigration status and want to communicate with federal officials, § 1373 
protects those officials from a “don’t tell” policy. The court did not agree with 
Sturgeon that the language of § 1373(a) restricting the “sending” of information to 
ICE should be read to conflict with a prohibition on “obtaining information” that 
could be sent to ICE.133 In the court’s view, § 1373(b) applies to restrictions on 
 
129. Id. § 1373(c). 
130. Sturgeon v. Bratton, 95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 718, 726 (Ct. App. 2009). 
131. Id. at 730. 
132. Id. at 731. 
133. Id. 
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local entities that deal with the maintenance and exchange of information. 
Congress had the opportunity to prohibit restrictions on the obtaining of 
immigrant status information by local entities, but did not.134  
Moreover, if “in any way restrict[ing]” communication with ICE is read to 
include obtaining information to give ICE, there would be no need for § 1373(b) to 
specifically permit local entities to maintain immigration information and 
exchange it with other governmental entities as maintaining such information and 
obtaining it from other governmental entities makes the information available to 
be transmitted to ICE.135  
In short, the court felt that Sturgeon’s “strained interpretation” of § 1373 
was not supported by the language of the statute.136  
The heart of Sturgeon’s preemption claim was based on an alleged overlap 
between S.O. 40 and § 1373 resulting in the federal law preempting the 
department’s order. However, the plaintiff offered no evidence that, as applied, 
S.O. 40 overlapped with the restrictions of § 1373. The court would not nullify the 
order on preemption grounds simply based on a “hypothetical possibility” of 
being applied in contravention to § 1373.137 
The court acknowledged that the power to regulate immigration generally is 
viewed as an exclusive federal power. However, that does not mean that every 
subfederal regulation “touching on aliens” is invalid.138 Invalid state regulations of 
immigration involve laws that determine who “should or should not be admitted 
into the country, and the conditions under which a legal entrant may remain.”139 
Short of that, the subfederal law is preempted only when compelled by 
“affirmative congressional action.”140 Here, S.O. 40 is a “regulation of police 
conduct and not a regulation of immigration,” so preemption did not apply.141 
The court also concluded that S.O. 40 is not preempted on the grounds that 
it conflicts with the intent of Congress in enacting § 1373 and “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment” of that intention.142 The goal of § 1373 was to 
make sure that “the voluntary flow of immigration information” to ICE from 
local officials was not restricted. Here, that “voluntary flow of immigration 
information” was not affected between LAPD officers and ICE.143 S.O. 40 
 
134. Id. As I explain later in the Article, in my view the Tenth Amendment would prohibit 





138. Id. at 732. 
139. Id. 




Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete) 4/17/2012  1:22 PM 
272 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:247 
 
concerns the initiation of investigations and does not bar any officers from 
voluntarily contacting ICE. There was no evidence that S.O. 40 was applied or 
interpreted in a way that conflicted with § 1373, and the court would not make any 
assumptions to the contrary.144  
C. The Tenth Amendment and Preemption 
In order to place City of New York v. United States and Sturgeon v. Bratton in 
proper context for evaluating sanctuary policies, we should step back a little, and 
take a closer look at the Tenth Amendment and the preemption doctrine. We 
need to ask whether federal laws violate the Tenth Amendment in precluding 
sanctuary policies. We also need to know if sanctuary policies are threatened by 
the preemption doctrine.  
1. Tenth Amendment 
A logical place to begin the constitutional analysis is in determining whether 
the federal law with which sanctuary laws may be in conflict is valid. Namely, we 
need to address the question of whether 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644 are 
constitutional before we need to concern ourselves with whether they preempt 
sanctuary laws. Since the field of immigration is clearly within Congress’s province 
to act, in answering the question of the constitutionality of these federal laws, 
Tenth Amendment jurisprudence becomes relevant. 
As discussed above, in City of New York v. United States, the city argued that 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644 were unconstitutional on the grounds that the federal 
laws violated the Tenth Amendment by not allowing the city to control 
immigration status information as it saw fit and interfered with control of its own 
employees.145 The Second Circuit did not agree with the city’s Tenth Amendment 
claim because the laws did not, in the court’s opinion, compel New York City to 
enforce federal immigration laws; rather, the law simply forbade restrictions on 
voluntary cooperation, and the court concluded that the Tenth Amendment did 
not protect the states from passive resistance.146 Additionally, the court held that 
the federal laws did not interfere with the city’s general police power to regulate its 
operations without more evidence that the city’s ordinance was intended as a more 
generalized restriction on the dissemination of confidential information.147  
 
144. Id. Sturgeon also relied on 8 U.S.C. § 1644, “which prevents prohibitions or restrictions on 
the communications between any ‘[s]tate or local government entity’ and ICE.” Id. at 725 n.6. 
However, the court found that this case concerned communication between officers (not entities) and 
ICE, so § 1644 was not relevant. Id. 
145. See supra notes 89–111 and accompanying text. 
146. City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1999). 
147. In fact in 2001, “New York City voters responded by adopting an amendment to the 
city’s charter embodying the structural privacy principles that the [Second Circuit] had tentatively 
articulated,” in order to strengthen the city’s Tenth Amendment claim. Anil Kalhan, The Fourth 
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A fair reading of the Supreme Court’s most recent cases on the Tenth 
Amendment (including a Supreme Court case decided after the Second Circuit 
decision) suggests that the Second Circuit’s reasoning is plausible with respect to 
New York City’s policy at the time. However, the cases also suggest that the 
constitutionality of the federal laws can turn on whether they are interpreted to 
affirmatively mandate certain behavior by subfederal officials or simply prohibit 
certain conduct. Whichever reading, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the area 
provides ample support for the constitutionality of sanctuary policies that do not 
restrict voluntary cooperation with federal immigration authorities. However, in 
spite of the Second Circuit’s opinion to the contrary, in my view, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence is not definitive on the question of whether federal laws could 
validly prohibit subfederal laws that restrict even voluntary cooperation with 
federal officials. 
The Tenth Amendment provides, “The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.” The Tenth Amendment has been interpreted 
“to encompass any implied constitutional limitation on Congress’s authority to 
regulate state activities, whether grounded in the Tenth Amendment itself or in 
principles of federalism derived generally from the Constitution.”148 And, “the 
Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject 
to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.”149 
In the 1990s, the Supreme Court began using the Tenth Amendment more 
boldly to place limits on congressional power. Under this approach, the Tenth 
Amendment is a key protection of states’ rights and federalism. The idea is that 
the Tenth Amendment reserves a zone of activity to the states for their exclusive 
control, and federal laws intruding into this zone should be declared 
unconstitutional.150  
Three common justifications are offered for the use of the Tenth 
Amendment in protecting federalism. “The first justification for protecting states 
from federal intrusions is that the division of power vertically, between federal and 
state governments, lessens the chance of federal tyranny.”151 “A second frequently 
invoked value of federalism is that states are closer to the people and thus more 
likely to be responsive to public needs and concerns.”152 Of course this value of 
federalism could be inconsistent with the first value.  
To the extent that voters at the state and local level prefer tyrannical rule 
 
Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1215 
(2008). 
148. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 511 n.5 (1988). 
149. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992). 
150. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 313 (3rd ed. 2009). 
151. Id. at 313–14. 
152. Id. at 314. 
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or, more likely, rule that abuses a particular minority group, greater 
responsiveness increases the dangers of subfederal government tyranny. 
In other words, the substantive result of decreasing tyranny will not 
always be best achieved by the approach of maximizing electoral 
responsiveness; indeed, the reverse might well be the result. In fact, there 
is a greater danger of special interests capturing government at smaller 
and more local levels.153  
This concern is important in understanding why subfederal anti-immigrant laws 
do not earn Tenth Amendment protections, in my view.154 “A final argument 
made for protecting federalism is that states can serve as laboratories for 
experimentation.”155 In the words of Louis Brandeis: “It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”156 But again, if local experimentation 
tyrannizes a particular minority group (e.g., immigrants) then the values of the 
Tenth Amendment are not achieved through protecting states’ rights. 
The Tenth Amendment cases of the 1990s were grounded in the Supreme 
Court’s 1976 case, National League of Cities v. Usery.157 There, the court declared 
unconstitutional the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act, which required 
the payment of the minimum wage to state and local employees. “[T]here are 
limits upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty, even when 
 
153. Id. at 314–15. 
154. See supra notes 180–83 and accompanying text. 
155. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 315. 
156. Id. Some have argued that local experimentation should be permitted in the immigration 
field. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. 
REV. 567 (2008) (arguing that the “primary function state and local governments play [with regard to 
migration management] is to facilitate the integration of immigrants into public life”); Peter H. 
Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57 (2007) (advocating local 
involvement in immigration because “in the administration and enforcement of immigration policy, 
the federal government needs all the help it can get”); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration 
Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627 (1997) (arguing that local participation serves as a “steam-valve” 
for federal immigration policy). This argument has been made in response to scholars who have 
concluded that local efforts to regulate immigration are generally preempted. See, e.g., Pratheepan 
Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies and Immigration Federalism: A Dialectic Analysis, 
55 WAYNE L. REV. 1683 (2009); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 
61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008); Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration 
Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361 (1999); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? 
Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373 (2006); Rick Su, A Localist 
Reading of Local Immigration Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619 (2008); Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of 
Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493 (2001); 
Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084 
(2004). These articles on federalism and immigration offer theoretical suggestions. However, in this 
Article, I rely on the actual approach that the Supreme Court is using with respect to federalism and 
the Supremacy Clause. 
157. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
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exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regulate commerce.”158 
Requiring states to pay their employees the minimum wage violated the Tenth 
Amendment because the law “operate[s] to directly displace the States’ freedom to 
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.”159 
Forcing state and local governments to pay their employees minimum wage would 
require that they either raise taxes or cut other service to pay these costs. This 
would displace decisions traditionally left to the states and could “substantially 
restructure traditional ways in which the local governments have arranged their 
affairs.”160 Importantly, the court noted that Congress violates the Tenth 
Amendment when it interferes with traditional state and local government 
functions.161 Although the Court did not attempt to define all such traditional 
functions, establishing a minimum wage was clearly one, and therefore the federal 
requirement was unconstitutional.  
Using these principles, the Supreme Court invalidated a federal law that 
violated the Tenth Amendment in New York v. United States in 1992.162 The federal 
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act created a statutory duty for 
states to provide for the safe disposal of radioactive wastes generated within their 
borders. The Act provided monetary incentives for states to comply with the law 
and allowed states to impose a surcharge on radioactive wastes received from 
other states. Additionally, and most controversially, to ensure effective state 
government action, the law provided that states would “take title” to any wastes 
within their borders that were not properly disposed of by a certain date, and then 
would “be liable for all damages directly or indirectly incurred.”163 
Although Congress, pursuant to its authority under the commerce clause, 
could regulate the disposal of radioactive wastes, the Court held that the “take 
title” provision of the law was unconstitutional because it gave state governments 
the choice between “either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according 
to the instructions of Congress.”164 It was impermissible for Congress to impose 
either option on the states. Forcing states to accept ownership of radioactive 
wastes would impermissibly “commandeer” state governments, and requiring state 
compliance with federal regulatory statutes would impermissibly impose on states 
a requirement to implement federal legislation. Because of the Tenth Amendment 
and limits on the scope of Congress’s powers under Article I, the Court ruled that 
the “Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a 
federal regulatory program.”165 Allowing Congress to commandeer state 
 
158. Id. at 842. 
159. Id. at 852. 
160. Id. at 849. 
161. Id. at 842–43. 
162. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
163. Id. at 153. 
164. Id. at 175. 
165. Id. at 188. 
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governments would undermine government accountability because Congress 
could make a decision but the states would take the political heat and be held 
responsible for a decision that was not theirs.166 In fact, if a federal law compels a 
state legislative or regulatory activity, the law is unconstitutional under the Tenth 
Amendment even if there is a compelling need for the federal action.167 Thus, the 
central holding of New York is that it is unconstitutional for Congress to compel 
state legislatures to adopt laws or state agencies to adopt regulations. However, 
Congress may attach strings on grants to state and local governments and through 
these conditions induce state and local actions that it cannot directly compel.168  
A few years later, in Printz v. United States,169 the Supreme Court again used 
the Tenth Amendment to strike down a federal statute. The Court held that the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act violated the Tenth Amendment in 
requiring that state and local law enforcement officers conduct background checks 
on prospective handgun purchasers. Congress was impermissibly commandeering 
state executive officials to implement a federal mandate. The Court felt that 
Congress violates the Tenth Amendment when it conscripts state governments. 
The Brady law was unconstitutional because it compelled state officers to act and 
also violated separation of powers. The Constitution vests executive power in the 
President, and Congress impermissibly gave the executive authority to implement 
the law to state and local law enforcement personnel.170 The Court explained: 
The Brady Act effectively transfers this responsibility to thousands of 
[chief law enforcement officers] in the fifty states, who are left to 
implement the program without meaningful presidential control (if 
indeed meaningful presidential control is possible without the power to 
appoint and remove). The insistence of the Framers upon unity in the 
federal executive—to insure both vigor and accountability—is well 
known. That unity would be shattered, and the power of the President 
would be subject to reduction, if Congress could act as effectively 
without the President as with him, by simply requiring state officers to 
execute its law.171 
Finally, in Reno v. Condon,172 a unanimous Court rejected a Tenth Amendment 
challenge in upholding the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act. The law “prohibited 
states from disclosing personal information gained by departments of motor 
vehicles, such as home addresses, phone numbers, social security numbers, and 
 
166. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 323–24. 
167. Id. at 324. 
168. Id. In the immigration enforcement area, when local police or sheriff’s departments enter 
into INA section 287(g) agreements to assist in immigration enforcement efforts, funding is an 
incentive that is provided to the local entities. 
169. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
170. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 324–25. 
171. Printz, 521 U.S. at 922. 
172. 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
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medical information.”173 “The law was constitutional as an exercise of Congress’s 
commerce clause power because ‘Congress found that many States . . . sell this 
personal information to individuals and businesses [and these] sales generate 
significant revenues for the States.’”174 The Court “stressed that the law is not 
limited to state governments; it also regulates private entities that possess the 
drivers’ license information” for resale and redisclosure.175 Most importantly, the 
Court said that the law did not violate the Tenth Amendment because it was a 
prohibition of conduct, not an affirmative mandate as in New York and Printz: “It 
does not require the [state] Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does 
not require state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regulating 
private individuals.”176 
Thus, Reno v. Condon can be interpreted as holding that Congress may 
prohibit state governments from engaging in harmful conduct, particularly if the 
law applies to private entities as well. However, we know from other Tenth 
Amendment cases that Congress may not impose affirmative duties on state 
governments. Whether this distinction between prohibition and obligation makes 
sense can be questioned. Most duties can be characterized either way. The 
Driver’s Privacy Protection Act could be characterized as imposing the affirmative 
duty on states to keep information secret. Conversely, the Brady Act in Printz 
could be characterized as a prohibition on state and local governments from 
issuing gun permits without doing background checks. Also, it can be questioned 
whether an otherwise impermissible regulation of state governments should 
become acceptable because it includes private actors as well. Despite all these 
questions, the court relies on a distinction between affirmative obligations and 
negative prohibitions that is well established in constitutional law.177 
Reno v. Condon, decided after City of New York, arguably lends support to the 
Second Circuit’s decision because 8 U.S.C. § 1373 also does not require state 
officials to assist in federal immigration law enforcement, but simply bars 
restrictions on voluntary communications.178 On the other hand, one could argue 
 
173. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 325. 
174. Id. at 325–26 (quoting Reno, 528 U.S. at 143–44). 
175. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 326. 
176. Reno, 528 U.S. at 151. 
177. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 326. 
178. After Condon, the Supreme Court decided another commerce clause case that raised the 
Tenth Amendment indirectly, providing some food for thought on the sanctuary issue. In Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), medical marijuana patients in California challenged the constitutionality of 
provisions in the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) that designates marijuana as contraband. Under 
California law, the plaintiffs were authorized to use marijuana for their serious medical conditions, but 
federal agents seized and destroyed their cannabis plants. The Supreme Court upheld the CSA, ruling 
that federal regulation of marijuana was well within congressional authority under the Commerce 
Clause. After the decision, the California Attorney General opined that under the Tenth Amendment, 
the federal government’s decision to criminalize marijuana “for all purposes does not require 
California to do the same.” Letter from Jonathan K. Renner, Deputy Att’y Gen., State of Cal. Dep’t 
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that § 1373 is more than a “prohibition of conduct” in that it mandates subfederal 
jurisdictions to enact laws that bar officials from preventing the discussion of 
immigration status. In Reno v. Condon, the federal law barred state governments 
(and private actors) from selling private information, and the court labeled the 
federal law a prohibition. However, if a sanctuary law barred local officials from 
asking about immigration status, a federal law that sought to prevent such local 
restrictions could just as well be labeled a mandate or a prohibition. 
Where does the Tenth Amendment jurisprudence leave us in the context of 
federal laws (8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644) that prohibit bars on voluntary 
communication about immigration status between local officials and federal 
authorities because of sanctuary laws? We know that Congress could not mandate 
that subfederal law enforcement officials ask about immigration status without 
stepping into the minefield of anticommandeering language of cases like Printz and 
New York v. United States. Congress cannot require subfederal law enforcement 
officers to enforce federal immigration laws. In that respect, §§ 1373 and 1644 are 
certainly on safe footing because they contain no such affirmative mandates. We 
also know that a sanctuary policy that permits voluntary communication between 
local authorities and federal officials is probably fine.179 The murkier question is 
whether federal prohibitions against subfederal laws that prevent voluntary 
communications between local officials and federal officials are valid under the 
Tenth Amendment.  
The only decision that has come close to addressing this question is the 
Second Circuit’s City of New York case, which leaves some room for interpretation 
under a different set of facts. Certainly, the decision suggests that the federal 
prohibitions against laws that close off voluntary cooperation do not violate the 
Tenth Amendment because they do not force subfederal entities to enact or 
administer a federal program nor conscript local officials to do federal work.180 
However, the court’s approach to the question of whether the federal provisions 
interfered with the city’s operations by regulating confidential information 
obtained in the course of official business and seeking to control the actions of 
city officials leaves an important opening. On the facts in City of New York, the 
Second Circuit refused to conclude that there was an “impermissible intrusion” 
 
of Justice, to Robert D. Tousignant, Chief Counsel, Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., Department of 
Health Services’s Questions Regarding Medical Marijuana Identification Cards and Federal Law (July 
15, 2005), available at http://aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/ca_attorney_general_ltr.pdf. Relying on Printz 
and New York, the attorney general decided that even though state law enforcement officers knew the 
identities of state authorized medical marijuana users, officers were not required to arrest such 
individuals under the CSA. Id. The attorney general did concede, however, that state identity records 
could be subject to a federal subpoena. Id. This is arguably analogous to the sanctuary situation: local 
authorities are not required to enforce federal immigration laws or to ask about immigration status; 
once the immigration status is known, however, the federal law provides that the state cannot stop an 
officer from voluntarily turning over information to federal authorities. 
179. This preemption issue is discussed below. See infra notes 183–84 and accompanying text. 
180. City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 34–35 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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into city business because the sanctuary policy “singled out” federal immigration 
officials in declining to share immigration status information.181 To the court, that 
was evidence that the Executive Order was not “integral” to local government 
operations.182 The clear implication is that if local officials are barred from 
gathering and sharing immigration status information to all interested parties 
because of important public policy considerations, the outcome in the Second 
Circuit case could have been different.  
This is an important lesson for those supporting sanctuary policies. By 
explaining that the policies are based on community or preventive policing policy 
goals of gaining the trust of all parts of the community for public safety reasons, 
federal policies that would intrude on those goals could very well run afoul of the 
Tenth Amendment. In other words, even though §§ 1373 and 1644 are couched in 
terms of precluding bars on voluntary communications, those requirements 
arguably mandate local laws that do not interfere with voluntary communications, 
but in the process that mandate interferes with the administration of local public 
safety decisions. Local requirements that bar the seeking and sharing of 
immigration status information to all would be strong evidence of a serious public 
policy decision relating to public safety. In my view, therefore, sanctuary policies 
aimed at preventing local law enforcement officials from delving into the 
immigration status of criminal victims, witnesses, or minor offenders would be 
shielded by the Tenth Amendment against federal attempts to delve into that 
information even under the guise of permitting voluntary communications. Much 
in the way that the Supreme Court has deferred to state governments in their 
discrimination against lawful permanent residents in the area of state public 
functions employment because of legitimate state public interests,183 public safety 
and community policy goals of sanctuary ordinances are expressions of public 
policies on spending and enforcement priorities that also deserve deference. 
This reading of the Tenth Amendment jurisprudence may be controversial. 
Not surprisingly, jurisdictions such as San Francisco, New York City, and Los 
Angeles retain language in their policies that bar sharing of information “unless 
required by federal law,” presumably responsive to the voluntary communication 
protections of §§ 1373 and 1644. The City Attorney of San Francisco even has 
gone so far as to advise that a local official who voluntarily communicates 
immigration status information to ICE officials is not to be disciplined under the 
local sanctuary ordinance.184 These examples demonstrate a concession, however 
 
181. Id. at 36–37. 
182. Id. at 36. 
183. See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). 
184. “[I]f the City attempted to enforce the new [sanctuary ordinance] policy by disciplining 
an employee for violating it, the City could be exposed to damages for unlawful termination.” Legal 
Issues in Connection with Proposed Amendment to Sanctuary City Ordinance, Memorandum from 
Buck Delventhal, Miriam Morley & Wayne Snodgrass, Deputy City Att’ys of S.F., to Mayor Gavin 
Newsom, at 5 (Aug. 18, 2009) (on file with author). 
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unnecessary in my view, on the part of local policy makers that §§ 1373 and 1644 
are constitutional. They take a defensive posture thinking that this position is 
necessary to defend against claims that their sanctuary policies are not preempted 
by valid federal law. In my view, their concession is unnecessary because §§ 1373 
and 1644 have Tenth Amendment problems when they attempt to force local 
cooperation when resistance is based on a sanctuary policy premised on public 
safety and spending judgments. 
2. Preemption of State and Local Laws 
If one assumes that §§ 1373 and 1644 do not violate the Tenth Amendment, 
the next question is whether federal law preempts sanctuary policies. Under 
Article VI’s Supremacy Clause, the Constitution and laws made pursuant to it are 
the supreme law of the land. When federal and state laws conflict, the state law 
must yield: “[U]nder the Supremacy Clause, from which our preemption doctrine 
is derived, ‘any state law, however clearly within a State’s acknowledged power, 
which interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield.’”185 
Although preemption may appear, at first glance, to be a straightforward 
concept, in fact there is not a bright-line rule for deciding whether a state or local 
law should be invalidated on preemption grounds. Traditionally, the Supreme 
Court has identified two major situations where preemption occurs. One is where 
a federal law expressly preempts state or local law. The other is where preemption 
is implied by a clear congressional intent to preempt state or local law.  
In Gade v. National Solid Waste Management Association, the Court noted that 
the tests for preemption may be either express or implied, and is compelled 
whether Congress’s command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or 
implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.186 Of course, express and implied 
preemption can interact. Even when statutory language expressly preempts state 
law, Congress rarely is clear about the scope of what is preempted or how 
particular situations should be handled. Courts must decide what is preempted, 
and this inevitably is an inquiry into congressional intent. Conversely, implied 
preemption is often a function of both perceived congressional intent and the 
language used in the statute or regulation. The problem, of course, is that 
Congress’s intent, especially as to the scope of preemption, is rarely expressed or 
clear. In fact, I argue below that while 8 U.S.C. § 1373 may have been intended to 
protect the voluntary exchange of information between local law enforcement and 
federal immigration authorities, the law does not (and probably could not) 
mandate local police to ask crime victims and witnesses about immigration 
status—the heart of sanctuary and confidentiality policies. In fact, the federal 
statute does not mandate asking about the immigration status of arrested 
 
185. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 108 (1992) (citations omitted). 
186. Id. at 98. 
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individuals prior to conviction.187 Congressional intent must be clear to find 
preemption because of a desire, stemming from federalism concerns, to minimize 
invalidation of state and local laws. 
[B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we 
have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law 
causes of action. In all preemption cases, and particularly in those in 
which Congress has “legislated . . . in a field which the States have 
traditionally occupied,” we “start with the assumption that the historic 
police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act 
unless that was the clear and manifest purposes of Congress.”188 
Within the implied preemption situation, three types of implied preemption 
have been identified. One is termed “field preemption” where the scheme of 
federal law and regulation is “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference 
that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”189 The second is 
where there is a conflict between federal and state law. Even if federal law does 
not expressly preempt state law, preemption will be found where “compliance 
with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility.”190 Finally, 
implied preemption also will be found if state law impedes the achievement of a 
federal objective. Even if federal and state law are not mutually exclusive and even 
if there is no congressional expression of a desire to preempt state law, 
preemption will be found if state law “stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective of Congress.”191 
These categories frequently overlap in practice, and congressional intent, if it can 
be found, can be determinative.  
Provisions in federal statutes expressly preempting state and local laws 
inevitably require interpretation as to their scope and effect. The explosion of 
litigation concerning the preemption provision in the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) demonstrates this. ERISA broadly 
preempts state laws that “relate to” employee benefit plans.192 A key problem, 
though, is the inherent ambiguity in the phrase “relates to.” The spectrum of 
modifiers to the term is potentially wide—directly, slightly, remotely. Thus, 
employers and others have argued that many state laws—from family leave to 
workers compensation to health care finance to malpractice claims—are 
preempted by ERISA because they “relate to” employee benefit plans. The sheer 
quantity of ERISA litigation shows that an express preemption provision leaves 
open countless questions about the scope of that preemption. Therefore, simply 
 
187. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
188. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (citations omitted). 
189. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
190. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963). 
191. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
192. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
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pointing out that a subfederal law or policy “relates to” immigration is not 
sufficient to strike it down on preemption grounds. 
a. Field Preemption 
Even without express preemption, the Court will find implied preemption if 
there is a clear congressional intent that federal law should exclusively occupy a 
field. The Court has said that such preemption exists if “either . . . the nature of 
the regulated subject matter permits no other exclusion, or that the Congress has 
unmistakably so ordained.” So field preemption can be found either if Congress 
expresses a clear intent that federal law will be exclusive in an area or if 
comprehensive federal regulation evidences a congressional desire that federal law 
should completely occupy the field. Intent can be found from a “scheme of 
federal regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress 
left no room for the States to supplement it.”193 
The subjects of foreign policy and immigration provide examples of field 
preemption. When it comes to managing foreign affairs, the federal government 
has sole authority, so a state attempt to regulate in the area would be preempted. 
However, how far the Court would go to strike down a state or local law on 
preemption grounds is a challenge when the law has an “indirect effect” on 
immigration or foreign affairs.194  
A good example is Hines v. Davidowitz.195 Pennsylvania enacted a law that 
required all immigrants to pay a registration fee and carry a state identification 
card—a process that the federal government already required. The Supreme Court 
struck down the state registration law on preemption grounds because registration 
“is in a field which affects international relations, the one aspect of our 
government that from the first has been most generally conceded imperatively to 
demand broad national authority.”196 In what serves as a standard description of 
federal immigration power, the Court emphasized the “broad and comprehensive 
plan describing the terms and conditions upon which aliens may enter this 
country, how they may acquire citizenship, and the manner in which they may be 
deported.”197 Pervasive federal regulation existed, and in the context of the 
Pennsylvania statute, a federal law already specifically required alien registration 
with the federal government. 
Hines is significant because even though the state law technically 
complemented and did not interfere with the federal law, the Court still found 
preemption. The fact that the Court relied on field preemption also is noteworthy 
because no direct preemption language was contained in the federal immigration 
 
193. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. 
194. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 402. 
195. 312 U.S. 52 (1941). 
196. Hines, 312 U.S. at 68. 
197. Id. at 69. 
Assembled_V2I1_v5 (Do Not Delete) 4/17/2012  1:22 PM 
2012] IMMIGRATION SANCTUARY POLICIES 283 
 
law. Thus, as Dean Chemerinsky points out, “Field preemption means that federal 
law is exclusive in the area and preempts state laws even if they serve the same 
purposes as the federal law and do not impede the implementation of federal 
law.”198 
Interestingly, in the challenge to Arizona’s S.B. 1070, the state argued that its 
law complements federal law, but as we can see, the Hines decision is not helpful 
to Arizona. In fact, in the Arizona case, the federal court of appeals has agreed 
with the federal government’s argument that the state law actually interferes with 
the federal government’s enforcement plan.199 However, whether preemption 
should be found in the absence of an explicit congressional declaration is 
ultimately “a tension between the desire to effectuate the interests of the federal 
government and the desire to limit the instances where state power is limited.”200 
Putting the field preemption principles announced in Hines to use, the 
Supreme Court struck down a California law that barred aliens ineligible for 
citizenship from purchasing commercial fishing licenses.201 The Court’s language 
was clear: 
The Federal Government has broad constitutional powers in determining 
what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may 
remain, regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms 
and conditions of their naturalization. Under the Constitution the states 
are granted no such powers . . . . State laws which impose discriminatory 
burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within the 
United States conflict with this constitutionally derived federal power to 
regulate immigration.202 
Again, Arizona’s defense of S.B. 1070 finds no help in a case like Takahashi 
because the state law definitely puts a discriminatory burden on the entrance of 
lawful immigrants insofar as its terms can lead to racial profiling of citizens and 
lawful residents.203 
Similarly, in Toll v. Moreno,204 the Court invoked preemption in striking a 
Maryland law that denied to “non-immigrant aliens” in-state tuition that was 
accorded to citizens and to “immigrant aliens.” The Court found preemption 
based on the “broad principle that ‘state regulation not congressionally sanctioned 
that discriminates against aliens lawfully admitted to the country is impermissible 
if it imposes additional burdens not contemplated by Congress.’”205 The state had 
directly contravened the federal approach to G-4 aliens (employees of 
 
198. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 403. 
199. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 350–52 (9th Cir. 2011). 
200. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 403. 
201. Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948). 
202. Id (emphasis added). 
203. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 360–66 (9th Cir. 2011). 
204. 458 U.S. 1 (1982). 
205. Id. at 12–13 (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 (1976)). 
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international organizations and their dependents). Federal law permitted them to 
establish domicile and afforded significant tax exemptions on organizational 
salaries. In such circumstances, the Court could not conclude that Congress ever 
contemplated that a State, in the operation of a university, might impose 
discriminatory tuition charges and fees solely on account of the federal 
immigration classification. Therefore the state bar on G-4 aliens from acquiring 
in-state status violated the Supremacy Clause. 
However, in De Canas v. Bica, although the Court reminded that the “[p]ower 
to regulate immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power,”206 a state 
employer sanction law was not preempted because there the California law was 
about protecting lawful workers from unauthorized workers. The Court noted:  
[T]he Court has never held that every state enactment which in any way 
deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and thus per se pre-
empted by this constitutional power, whether latent or exercised. . . . 
[T]he fact that aliens are the subject of a state statute does not render it a 
regulation of immigration, which is essentially a determination of who 
should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions 
under which a legal entrant may remain.207 
Not all state regulations of aliens are ipso facto regulations of immigration.208 “In 
this case, California sought to strengthen its economy by adopting federal standards in 
imposing criminal sanctions against state employers who knowingly employed 
aliens who have no federal right to employment within the country; even if such 
local regulation had some purely speculative and indirect impact on 
immigration.”209 The Court reasoned that “it does not thereby become a 
constitutionally proscribed regulation of immigration that Congress itself would be 
powerless to authorize or approve. Thus, absent congressional action, [the state 
law] would not be an invalid state incursion on federal power.”210 
In Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting,211 the Supreme Court 
recently reaffirmed its approach in De Canas, holding that the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) did not preempt Arizona’s Legal Arizona 
Workers Act (not to be confused with the subsequently enacted S.B. 1070 that is 
the subject of separate litigation), which targets employers who hire 
undocumented immigrants and revokes their state business licenses. IRCA, which 
included a federal employer sanction law punishing employers who knowingly hire 
unauthorized workers, contains an express preemption provision, as well as a 
savings clause: “The provisions of this section preempt any State or local law 
 
206. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 354. 
207. Id. at 355. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. (emphasis added). 
210. Id. In the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Congress did in fact enact a 
federal employer sanction law that likely preempted the California law upheld in De Canas. 
211. 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). 
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imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) 
upon those who employ . . . unauthorized aliens.”212 The Court held that the Legal 
Arizona Workers Act fits within Congress’s intended meaning of licensing law in 
IRCA’s savings clause and is therefore not preempted. The Court also held that 
the INA, which makes the use of E-Verify voluntary, does not impliedly preempt 
Arizona from mandating that employers use the E-Verify system.  
De Canas and Whiting remind us that without express preemption, states 
possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the employment 
relationship to protect workers within the state. Child labor laws, minimum and 
other wage laws, laws affecting occupational health and safety, and workmen’s 
compensation laws are only a few examples. As I argue below, sanctuary policies 
similarly fall within these broad police powers to promote public safety through 
policies that are designed to gain community trust and allocate enforcement 
resources in accordance with those policies. 
Of course, even state regulation designed to protect vital state interests must 
give way to paramount federal legislation. But the Court in De Canas v. Bica and 
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting would not  
presume that Congress, in enacting the INA, intended to oust state 
authority to regulate the employment relationship covered by [the state 
law] in a manner consistent with pertinent federal laws. Only a 
demonstration that complete ouster of state power—including state 
power to promulgate laws not in conflict with federal laws—was “the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress” would justify that conclusion.213 
In contrast to De Canas, where the Court found that the state had an 
important economic goal behind its enactment of an employer sanction law,214 
Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and Hazleton, Pennsylvania’s no-renting-to-undocumented-
immigrants ordinance present different questions. While those jurisdictions might 
offer an economic basis for the law, evidence is quite clear that the real purpose 
behind the laws is regulation of immigration—an area that is preempted by federal 
law. For example, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer signed and supports S.B. 1070 
because the federal government “is not doing its job” of securing the border.215 
S.B. 1070 is about the regulation of immigration for its allies and Brewer.216 When 
 
212. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2) (2006). 
213. De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357 (citations omitted). 
214. Similarly, in Pacific Gas & Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development 
Commission, the Supreme Court concluded that a California law imposing a moratorium on the 
construction of nuclear power plants was not preempted because its main purpose was economics 
and not safety; the state withstood a preemption challenge that Congress had intended to preempt the 
field of nuclear regulation. 461 U.S. 190, 216, 222–23 (1983); see infra notes 231–35 and accompanying 
text. 
215. Howard Fischer, Will SB1070 Remain on Hold?, ARIZ. DAILY SUN, Nov. 2, 2010, 
http://azdailysun.com/news/state-and-regional/article_cfd0ac68-343a-5fc5-97d1-2464db66d7e8.html. 
216. The Ninth Circuit noted the immigration purpose behind S.B. 1070: 
In April 2010, in response to a serious problem of unauthorized immigration along the 
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Hazleton, Pennsylvania, enacted its ordinance, its supporters made clear that their 
intent was the control of Latino immigrants: 
The consequences which this immigration disaster holds for our children 
[are] horrendous. Coloreds will take political control of more states, along 
with both houses of Congress and the presidency. Whites will quickly be 
stripped of their rights with our wealth confiscated for redistribution to 
non-whites as is taking place in South Africa. . . . Will America become 
the United States of Mexico?217 
Unfortunately for lawmakers in Arizona and Hazleton, they do not have the 
authority to regulate immigration. 
Thus, in litigation challenging Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and Hazleton’s ordinance, 
the federal courts have had little difficulty in finding that the laws are preempted. 
In the Arizona case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the injunction of 
the primary provisions of the law on preemption grounds: the requirement that 
local law enforcement verify the immigration status of all arrestees; the new state 
law making it a crime for failing to carry immigration papers; another new law that 
made it a crime to apply for work without proper documentation; and the attempt 
to authorize local police to enforce the civil provisions of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.218 The court agreed with the federal government that its 
enforcement plan would be thwarted by Arizona’s law and was therefore 
preempted as an improper state attempt to regulate immigration.219 Although the 
Third Circuit’s decision on the Hazleton ordinance has been vacated for 
reconsideration in light of the Whiting decision, the court initially found that the 
no-renting-to-undocumented-immigrants provision was an attempt to “regulate 
which [immigrants] may live [here].”220 In other words, the ordinance attempted 
to regulate immigration, and was therefore preempted. 
b. Conflict Preemption 
If federal law and state law are mutually exclusive, so that a person could not 
simultaneously comply with both, the state law is deemed preempted. The 
Supreme Court has explained that such preemption exists when “compliance with 
 
Arizona-Mexico border, the State of Arizona enacted its own immigration law 
enforcement policy [S.B. 1070, which] “make[s] attrition through enforcement the public 
policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona.” 
United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 2011). 
217. Transcript of Record Vol. 2 at 5–6, Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477 
(M.D. Pa. 2007) (No. 3:06-CV-1586), available at http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/lozano2.pdf. 
218. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d at 366. 
219. Id. 
220. Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 620 F.3d 170, 220 (3d Cir. 2010), vacated, 131 S. Ct. 2958 
(2011). The Supreme Court has asked the Third Circuit to reconsider Lozano in light of the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011). However, 
as long as the evidence reveals that the purpose behind the Hazleton ordinance is the regulation of 
immigration, the ordinance faces serious preemption problems nonetheless. 
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both federal and state regulation is a physical impossibility.”221 The difficulty with 
regard to this type of preemption is in deciding whether there is a conflict between 
federal and state law.  
There also are many harder cases that depend on determining federal intent 
in order to decide whether the federal law and state law are mutually exclusive. For 
example, if a state law conflicts with a federal goal, the state law can still be 
preempted even though there is no conflict with a specific federal law and in the 
absence of field preemption. In short, the state law is preempted if it “stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes or objectives 
of Congress.”222 Thus, in Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, the Court 
determined that the filing of unfair labor practices was a primary purpose of the 
National Labor Relations Act.223 Any law that punished such a filing, such as the 
denial of unemployment benefits, was preempted. Likewise, in Perez v. Campbell, 
the Court ruled that the suspension of a driver’s license under state law was 
preempted by federal bankruptcy laws because the debt arising from an auto 
accident had been discharged by the bankruptcy court.224 Otherwise, the 
uniformity goals of the federal bankruptcy laws with respect to debts would be 
thwarted by state law.  
In a challenge to an immigration package enacted by the Alabama state 
legislature, a federal district court judge upheld two provisions over conflict 
preemption arguments advanced by the federal government. In United States v. 
Alabama,225 the provisions that have been allowed to go into force include the 
authority of local law enforcement officers to detain or arrest anyone who is 
reasonably suspected of being undocumented and if a person is arrested for 
driving without a license and the officer is unable to determine that the person has 
a valid driver’s license, the person must be transported to the nearest magistrate; 
and a reasonable effort shall be made to determine the citizenship of the driver.226  
 
221. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963). 
222. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
223. Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235 (1967). 
224. Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971). 
225. No. 2:11-CV-2746-SLB, 2011 WL 4469941, at *19 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 2011). 
226. The contract provision lists two exceptions, that “[n]o court of this state shall enforce the 
terms of, or otherwise regard as valid, any contract between a party and an alien unlawfully present in 
the United States.” Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Final Consent Judgment, 
Perez v. GTX Auto Import & Auto Repair, LLC, No. CV 2010-904012, (Cir. Ct. Jefferson County 
Ala. Oct. 24, 2011), available at http://media.al.com/spotnews/other/Judge%20Vowell%20Immigration% 
20Order%2010.24.2011.pdf. An Alabama Circuit Judge has pointed, however, that the anticontracting 
provision still has to overcome a big obstacle—the Alabama state constitution’s command that 
There can be no law of this state impairing the obligation of contracts by destroying or 
impairing the remedy for their enforcement; and the legislature shall have no power to 
revive any right or remedy which may have become barred by lapse of time, or by any 
statute of this state. After suit has been commenced on any cause of action, the legislature 
shall have no power to take away such cause of action, or destroy any existing defense to 
such suit. 
Id. Because the opinion deals with a breach of contract suit that was filed by an undocumented 
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On the other hand, the district court did strike down on conflict grounds the 
Alabama provision that would make it a state crime for an unauthorized alien to 
solicit or perform work in the state. The court found that the provision directly 
contravened Congress’s decision as part of the Immigration Reform and Control 
Act of 1986 that unauthorized work by the worker should not be criminalized.227 
If enforced, this provision would stand as an obstacle to IRCA’s employer 
sanctions scheme.228 Similarly, the district court struck down the state’s attempt to 
make it a state crime to harbor or transport an undocumented alien, to establish a 
civil cause of action against an employer who fails to hire a citizen while hiring an 
unauthorized worker, and to forbid employers from claiming a business tax 
deduction for wages paid to an unauthorized worker. Furthermore, even though 
the district court initially upheld four controversial provisions—one making it a 
state misdemeanor for an undocumented person to carry an alien registration 
document, a second that required public schools to check immigration status of 
school children for data purposes, and two others attempting to restrict the right 
of undocumented immigrants to enter into private contracts and business 
transactions with a state agency—the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has 
enjoined those four provisions.229 
c. Impeding Federal Objective 
The challenge in conflict preemption cases often “lies in determing the 
federal objective and whether a particular type of state law is consistent with it.”230 
A comparison of two particular Supreme Court cases is instructive. Pacific Gas & 
Electric v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission231 involved a 
state moratorium on nuclear power plant construction, while Gade v. National Solid 
Wastes Management Association232 involved a state law enacted for the health and 
safety of workers handling hazardous wastes. 
In Pacific Gas & Electric, California halted new nuclear power plants until a 
state commission could certify that the disposal of high-level nuclear wastes could 
be done safely. The company wanted to proceed with new construction plans, 
arguing both that the state law was preempted in the nuclear regulation field by 
 
immigrant before the law took effect, the opinion merely holds that the anti-immigrant law cannot 
constitutionally be applied to those suits because “the legislature shall have no power to take away” 
people’s right to pursue contacts claims that are already pending. Id. Nevertheless, the state court also 
suggests that the entire anticontracting provision may violate the state constitution’s requirement that 
no law may “destroy[ ]  or impair the remedy” for enforcing a contract in court. Id. 
227. Alabama, 2011 WL4469941, at *21. 
228. Id. at *25. 
229. United States v. Alabama, Hispanic Interest Coalition v. Governor of Alabama, No. 11-
14532-CC slip op. at 13–15 (11th Cir. Oct. 14, 2011), modified, No. 11-14532-CC, (11th Cir. Mar. 8, 
2012). 
230. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 413. 
231. Pac. Gas & Elec. v. State Energy Res. Conserv. & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). 
232. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992). 
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congressional intent and that the state law interfered with the federal goal of 
developing nuclear power. However, the Court ruled in favor of the state, 
determining that Congress’s goal related to public safety, while California’s interest 
was economic. Congress might intend that the federal government have exclusive 
control over regulating safety, but “the States retain their traditional responsibility 
in the field of regulating electrical utilities for determining questions of need, 
reliability, costs, and other related state concerns.”233 The state’s primary purpose 
was economics and “not radiation hazards. . . . Without a permanent means of 
disposal, the nuclear waste problem could become critical, leading to 
unpredictably high costs to contain the problem or, worse, shutdowns in 
reactors.”234 
The approach of the Court in Pacific Gas & Electric, is revealing: 
Thus, in determining whether the California law interfered with 
achieving the federal objective, the Court had to make two major choices: 
One was in characterizing the federal objective; the other was in 
characterizing the state law and its purpose. If the Court saw a broad 
purpose for the Atomic Energy Act in encouraging the development of 
nuclear power, then the state law, which obviously limited it, would be 
preempted. The Court avoided preemption by more narrowly 
characterizing the federal goal as promoting nuclear reactors only when 
they were economically feasible. 
Additionally, if the Court characterized California’s purpose as 
ensuring safety before construction of nuclear power, then the law would 
have been preempted. The Court avoided preemption by accepting 
California’s claim that its goal was economics, even though the law was 
written in terms of preventing construction of nuclear plants unless the 
safety of disposal was ensured. 
The Pacific Gas & Electric case thus illustrates how preemption 
determinations are very much based on the record and the context of the 
particular case. It also shows how much the outcome turns on the 
manner in which the Court chooses to characterize the purposes of the 
federal and state laws.235 
In Gade, the Court confronted a similar question but reached a different 
outcome. The federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and related 
federal regulations regulated the health and safety of workers who handled 
hazardous waste materials. Illinois enacted its own law that sought to protect the 
health and safety of such workers. The state argued that its purpose was not 
limited to the workers’ health and that public safety was a chief purpose. 
However, the Court rejected Illinois’s argument ruling that the federal law 
 
233. Pac. Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 205 (1983). 
234. Id. at 213–14. 
235. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 414. 
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“preempts all state law that constitutes in a direct, clear and substantial way, 
regulation of worker health and safety.”236 
Arguably, Gade is out of step with Pacific Gas & Electric. In Pacfic Gas & 
Electric, the Court was open to California’s two reasons for halting new nuclear 
power plants—public safety and economics. However, the Court was not open to 
Illinois’s two reasons for regulating workers—worker health and public safety. 
One could argue that the California nuclear power moratorium was inconsistent 
with the federal goal of encouraging more nuclear power and that the Illinois law 
complemented the federal interest in worker health. However, preemption was 
avoided in Pacific Gas & Electric because the Court placed more emphasis on the 
state economic purpose, while preemption was found in Gade because the Court 
was more impressed with the broad federal purpose in hazardous waste worker 
safety.237 
The point is that preemption based on state laws interfering with a federal 
goal turns on how the court characterizes the federal purpose. If a court wants to 
avoid preemption, it can narrowly construe the federal objective and interpret the 
state goal as different from or consistent with the federal purpose. But if a court 
wants to find preemption, it can broadly view the federal purpose and preempt a 
vast array of state laws as it did in Gade.238  
In the S.B. 1070 situation, the Ninth Circuit used a conflict preemption 
technique in addressing the Arizona provision that made it a state crime for an 
unauthorized alien to seek employment in the state. Congress made an 
“affirmative choice not to criminalize work as a method of discouraging 
unauthorized immigrant employment . . . .”239 Arizona argued that provisions of 
S.B. 1070 were intended to further “the strong federal policy of prohibiting illegal 
aliens from seeking employment in the United States.”240 However, by “pulling 
the lever of criminalizing work—which Congress specifically chose not to pull,” 
the Arizona law becomes an obstacle to the execution of Congress’s goals and 
objectives; the Arizona law was a “substantial departure from the approach 
Congress” chose to address the problem.241 
In contrast, sanctuary policies appear immune from preemption if we accept 
that their goals are about public safety and represent economic decisions on how 
to spend policing resources and are not about regulating immigrants. Indeed, the 
language of most sanctuary policies speaks in terms of not expending resources 
and personnel time asking about immigration status.242 
 
236. Gade, 505 U.S. at 107. 
237. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 150, at 416. 
238. Id. 
239. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339, 359 (9th Cir. 2011). 
240. Id. at 360 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
241. Id. at 360. 
242. See infra notes 319–25 and accompanying text. 
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3. Martinez v. Regents of University of California—An Analogous Example 
The California Supreme Court recently decided a preemption case involving 
a state law that, like sanctuary policies, sends a message of inclusion to 
undocumented immigrants. Under state law, California state universities permit 
undocumented college students who meet certain requirements to pay in-state 
tuition rates.243 In Martinez v. Regents of University of California, a unanimous state 
supreme court found that the tuition law was not preempted by a federal statute 
that prohibits states from making unlawful aliens eligible for postsecondary 
education benefits under certain circumstances.244 
In Martinez, plaintiffs, who were U.S. citizen residents of other states, 
challenged the California law, arguing that the state policy violated federal law and 
that they too should be eligible to pay in-state tuition fees. The main legal issue 
was this: The federal law, 8 U.S.C. § 1623, provides that an alien not lawfully 
present in this country shall not be eligible on the basis of residence within a state for 
any postsecondary education benefit unless a U.S. citizen is eligible for that 
benefit.245 In general, nonresidents of California who attend the state’s colleges 
and universities must pay nonresident tuition.246 But California Education Code 
section 68130.5(a) exempts from this requirement students—including those not 
lawfully in this country—who meet certain requirements, primarily that they have 
attended high school in California for at least three years. The question to the 
court was whether this exemption violated § 1623. 
The court held that section 68130.5 does not violate § 1623. The exemption 
is given to all who have attended high school in California for at least three years 
(and meet the other requirements), regardless of whether they are California 
residents. In other words, some who qualify for the exemption qualify as 
California residents for purposes of in-state tuition, but some do not. 
Furthermore, not all unlawful aliens who would qualify as residents but for their 
unlawful status are eligible for the exemption. In essence, the exemption is not 
based on residence in California. Rather, it is based on other criteria.  
Asserting a field preemption theory, the plaintiffs argued that federal 
immigration law preempted the state statute. The state supreme court 
acknowledged that the Supremacy Clause makes federal law paramount, that 
Congress has the power to preempt state law, and that the power “to regulate 
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power.”247 However, the court 
reminded us that, 
 
243. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5 (Deering 2011). 
244. 241 P.3d 855, 870 (Cal. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 2961 (2011); 8 U.S.C. § 1623 (2006). 
245. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(b). Section 1623 was enacted on September 30, 1996, as part of the 
omnibus Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
div. C, § 505, 110 Stat. 3009-672 (1996). 
246. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68050 (Deering 2011). 
247. Martinez, 241 P.3d at 861 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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While the immigration power is exclusive, it does not follow that any and 
all state regulations touching on aliens are preempted. Only if the state 
statute is in fact a “regulation of immigration,” i.e., “a determination of 
who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the 
conditions under which a legal entrant may remain,” is preemption 
structural and automatic. Otherwise, the usual rules of statutory 
preemption analysis apply; state law will be displaced only when 
affirmative congressional action compels the conclusion it must be.248 
In the court’s view, because section 68130.5 does not “regulate[ ]  who may 
enter or remain in the United States, [it would] proceed under the usual 
preemption rules.”249  
Plaintiffs contend that section 68130.5 violates this statute, i.e., that 
section 68130.5 makes an unlawful alien eligible for a benefit (in-state 
tuition) on the basis of residence without making a citizen eligible for the 
same benefit. When it enacted section 68130.5, the Legislature was aware 
of section 1623. Indeed, Governor Gray Davis had vetoed an earlier 
version of what eventually became section 68130.5 because he believed 
section 1623 would require that the same exemption from nonresident 
tuition be given to all out-of-state legal United States residents. During 
the legislative process leading to section 68130.5’s enactment, the state 
Legislative Counsel issued an opinion concluding that the provision 
would not conflict with section 1623. Ultimately, in an uncodified section 
of the bill enacting section 68130.5, the Legislature found that “[t]his act, 
as enacted during the 2001–02 Regular Session, does not confer 
postsecondary education benefits on the basis of residence within the 
meaning of Section 1623 of Title 8 of the United States Code.”250 
Plaintiffs’ central argument was that section 68130.5’s exemption from 
paying out-of-state tuition is based on residence. Section 1623(a) prohibits a state 
from making unlawful aliens eligible “on the basis of residence within a State” for 
a postsecondary education benefit.251 However, the California Supreme Court 
concluded that the exemption is based on other criteria, specifically, that persons 
possess a California high school degree or equivalent; that if they are unlawful 
aliens, they file an affidavit stating that they will try to legalize their immigration 
status; and, especially important here, that they have attended “[h]igh school . . . in 
California for three or more years.”252 Indeed, both before and after section 
68130.5’s enactment, the law has been that unlawful aliens cannot be deemed 
California residents for purposes of paying resident tuition.253 Moreover, many 
 
248. Id. at 861–62 (quoting In re Jose C., 198 P.3d 1087, 1098 (Cal. 2009)). 
249. Id. at 862 (quoting In re Jose C., 198 P.3d at 1098). 
250. Id. at 862–63 (citations omitted). 
251. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2006). 
252. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5(a)(1), (2), (4) (Deering 2011). 
253. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68062 (Deering 2011); see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. 
Superior Court, 276 Cal. Rptr. 197, 201 (1990). 
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unlawful aliens who would qualify as California residents but for their unlawful 
status, and thus would not have to pay out-of-state tuition, will not be eligible for 
section 68130.5’s exemption—only those who attended high school in California 
for at least three years and meet the other requirements are eligible for the 
exemption. 
The California court noted that if Congress had intended to prohibit states 
entirely from making unlawful aliens eligible for in-state tuition, it could easily 
have done so. It could simply have provided, for example, that “an alien who is 
not lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible” for a postsecondary 
education benefit.254 But it did not do so; instead, it provided that “an alien who is 
not lawfully present in the United States shall not be eligible on the basis of residence 
within a State” for a postsecondary education benefit.255 So § 1623 did not preclude 
California’s approach. 
Plaintiffs urged the court to consider Congress’s overall purpose in its 
immigration legislation in support of their expansive view of § 1623. After all, in 
determining Congress’s intent, courts may also consider the “structure and 
purpose of the statute as a whole.”256 Congress has provided statements of 
national policy concerning immigration. It stated that “[i]t continues to be the 
immigration policy of the United States that . . . the availability of public benefits 
not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States”257 and that “[i]t 
is a compelling government interest to remove the incentive for illegal 
immigration provided by the availability of public benefits.”258 In the court’s view, 
this general immigration policy may have supported an absolute ban on unlawful 
aliens receiving the exemption, but § 1623 does not impose an absolute ban.  
In the California court’s view, the fact that the state legislature’s primary 
motivation in enacting section 68130.5 was to give unlawful aliens who reside in 
California the benefit of resident tuition in a way that does not violate § 1623 did 
not doom the state law. The legislature found and declared that “[t]here are high 
school pupils who have attended elementary and secondary schools in this state 
for most of their lives and who are likely to remain, but are precluded from 
obtaining an affordable college education because they are required to pay 
nonresident tuition rates”; and that “[t]hese pupils have already proven their 
academic eligibility and merit by being accepted into our state’s colleges and 
universities.”259 While this description appears to apply primarily to unlawful 
aliens, the court found that nothing is legally wrong with the legislature’s attempt 
 
254. Martinez v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 241 P.3d 855, 862 (Cal. 2010). 
255. 8 U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
256. Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). 
257. 8 U.S.C § 1601(2)(B) (2006). 
258. 8 U.S.C § 1601(6). 
259. 2001 Cal. Stat. ch. 814, § 1, subd. (a)(1), (2). The sentiment is consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s sentiment in Plyler v. Doe that reminded us why it is important not to foreclose public 
education to undocumented students at the K-12 level. See infra note 325 and accompanying text. 
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to avoid § 1623. The mere desire to avoid the restrictions provides no basis to 
overturn the legislation. This is relevant to sanctuary policies that may be drafted 
in a manner to avoid preemption or conflict with federal law in order to benefit 
undocumented immigrants; careful drafting to avoid conflict does not render the 
policy invalid. 
Plaintiffs in Martinez also argued that section 68130.5 had a preemption 
problem with 8 U.S.C. § 1621. Section 1621 was enacted in August 1996, shortly 
before § 1623, as part of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRA).260 But the state court disagreed with the 
plaintiffs on that point as well.  
Section 1621 has two parts: (1) a general rule that unlawful aliens are not 
eligible for state or local public benefits (§ 1621(a)); and (2) a description of the 
circumstances under which a state may make an unlawful alien eligible for those 
public benefits, namely, by “affirmatively” expressing the benefit (§ 1621(d)).261 So 
in order to comply, the state statute must expressly state that it applies to 
undocumented aliens, rather than conferring a benefit generally without specifying 
that its beneficiaries may include undocumented aliens. The California court noted 
that if Congress had intended to require more, Congress should have said so 
clearly and not set a trap for unwary legislatures.  
Plaintiffs argued generally that section 68130.5 is impliedly preempted 
 
260. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 411, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); see also League of United Latin Am. 
Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1249, 1251, 1253 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
261. 8 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006). 
(a) In general 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law and except as provided in subsections 
(b) and (d) of this section, an alien who is not— 
(1) a qualified alien (as defined in section 1641 of this title), 
. . . 
is not eligible for any State or local public benefit (as defined in subsection (c) of this 
section). 
. . . 
(c) “State or local public benefit” defined 
(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), for purposes of this subchapter the 
term “State or local public benefit” means— 
(A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided by 
an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated funds of a State or local 
government; and 
(B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, 
postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar 
benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an individual, household, or 
family eligibility unit by an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated funds 
of a State or local government. 
. . . 
(d) State authority to provide for eligibility of illegal aliens for State and local public 
benefits 
A State may provide that an alien who is not lawfully present in the United States is 
eligible for any State or local public benefit for which such alien would otherwise be 
ineligible under subsection (a) of this section only through the enactment of a State law 
after August 22, 1996, which affirmatively provides for such eligibility. 
Pub. L. No. 104-193, §411. 
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through both field preemption and conflict preemption because of 8 U.S.C. § 
1621. The idea is that Congress’s intent to preempt can “be inferred if the scope 
of the statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy the legislative 
field, or if there is an actual conflict between state and federal law.”  
The California court disagreed. Critical to the implied preemption analysis is 
the existence of two express preemption statutes, namely §§ 1621 and 1623. 
However, in this case, Congress did not merely imply that matters beyond the 
preemptive reach of the statutes are not preempted; it said so expressly. Section 
1621(c) says that a state “may” provide public benefits for unlawful aliens if it 
does so in compliance with the statute’s requirements. This language shows 
Congress did not intend to occupy the field fully. Because section 68130.5 
complies with the conditions set out in both §§ 1621 and 1623, those statutes 
cannot impliedly preempt it.262 
Strangely, plaintiffs relied substantially on League of United Latin American 
Citizens v. Wilson,263 which held that federal law preempted the restrictions that 
Proposition 187, a voter initiative enacted in 1994, had placed on unlawful aliens. 
Provisions of Proposition 187 denied K–12 access to undocumented students and 
denied certain public benefits to undocumented immigrants. The court regarded 
Wilson as irrelevant to the issues in Martinez. Relying heavily on § 1621, the federal 
district court in Wilson concluded that California “is powerless to enact its own 
legislative scheme to regulate alien access to public benefits.”264 But the court 
added that California “can do what the PRA [including § 1621] permits, and 
nothing more.”265 The California court felt that the Wilson opinion indicated what 
§ 1621 barred, but left open the question of what § 1621 permits. And the 
California court in Martinez ruled that California’s tuition scheme was well within 
what is permitted. In short, section 68130.5 was not impliedly preempted. 
 
262. Although the California Supreme Court did address this issue, Congress’s definition of 
restricted “public benefits” does not appear to cover in-state tuition anyway: 
(c) “State or local public benefit” defined 
(1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), for purposes of this subchapter the 
term “State or local public benefit” means— 
(A) any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial license provided 
by an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated funds of a State or local 
government; and 
(B) any retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted housing, 
postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment benefit, or any other similar 
benefit for which payments or assistance are provided to an individual, household, or 
family eligibility unit by an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated funds 
of a State or local government. 
8 U.S.C. § 1621(c) (2006). Furthermore, Congress’s attempt to restrict state or local benefits appears 
to raise serious Tenth Amendment problems; restricting state or local benefits that are not necessarily 
funded by federal dollars would appear to be beyond the reach of Congress. 
263. 997 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997). 
264. Id. at 1261. 
265. Id. 
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The Martinez, Whiting, and De Canas cases teach us that carefully drafted 
subfederal laws that affect immigrants can avoid preemption problems. When the 
federal statute leaves room for state restrictions that serve a legitimate state 
purpose and do not in and of themselves regulate immigration, the subfederal 
action can be upheld. Under the Supreme Court’s preemption discourse, sanctuary 
policies that require local police to refrain from asking crime victims and witnesses 
about immigration status appear quite safe from any preemption claims (field, 
implied, or conflict). If 8 U.S.C. §§ 1373 and 1644 withstand Tenth Amendment 
scrutiny and are interpreted to bar subfederal policies that prevent the voluntary 
cooperation of a local officer with a federal officer, then as long as the local 
policies do not bar voluntary cooperation, no conflict with the federal statute 
arises. Whether a subfederal law that bars officers from asking about immigration 
status during traffic stops and other minor encounters is preempted by §§ 1373 
and 1644 may turn on whether the bar on asking is interpreted as being a restraint 
on voluntary cooperation. The DOJ inspector general has determined that at least 
three high profile “don’t ask” sanctuary jurisdictions do not prevent such 
voluntary cooperation, which suggests no conflict with federal law. Although the 
inspector general was aware that Oregon and San Francisco have official sanctuary 
policies, and that New York City’s executive order did the same, “in each instance, 
the local policy either did not preclude cooperation with ICE or else included a 
statement to the effect that those agencies and officers must assist ICE or share 
information with ICE as required by federal law.”266 
The question of whether sanctuary policies that bar officers from asking 
about immigration status would be preempted is also informed by the Pacific Gas 
& Electric case. The case illustrates how preemption determinations are very much 
based on the record and how the outcome turns on the manner in which the 
Court chooses to characterize the purposes of the federal and subfederal laws. In 
that case, the Court characterized the federal goal as promoting nuclear reactors 
only when they were economically feasible, rather than simply as encouraging the 
development of nuclear power. Conveniently, the Court characterized California’s 
state law purpose as economic, rather than in terms of preventing construction of 
nuclear plans unless disposal was safe.  
In the sanctuary context, if §§ 1373 and 1644 are construed to simply make 
sure that voluntary cooperation is not thwarted when a subfederal officer has 
information and wants to communicate, then a sanctuary policy based on a public 
policy decision to not ask about immigration status for effective community 
policing reasons does not conflict. The fact that “don’t ask” sanctuary policies 
generally come in the form of a decision to not spend public funds and resources 
on delving into immigration questions is more evidence that the decision is one 
 
266. AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COOPERATION OF SCAAP RECIPIENTS IN THE 
REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES 23 (2007). 
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about public expenditures for policing—something that is conventionally a local 
decision. Thus, the subfederal jurisdiction’s reliance on careful deliberation 
relating to public safety in its decision to initiate a sanctuary policy is an important 
part of the record. 
IV. GOOD POLICING 
The processes used by local governments and police departments in deciding 
to implement sanctuary policies reveal that their primary goal is public safety for 
the entire community. The long, often painstaking, deliberations have little to do 
with thwarting enforcement efforts by federal immigration officials. The goal 
simply is better policing. 
Consider the process in New Haven, Connecticut.267 In establishing its 
policy of making no distinction between documented and undocumented 
immigrants, the New Haven Police Department made clear that its mission and 
goals were to “protect life and property, prevent crime, and resolve problems.”268 
Determining the immigration status of the city’s residents was not part of its 
mission. Local policymakers drew a direct analogy between its program and the 
military’s former “don’t ask, don’t tell policy.”269 
Policymakers in New Haven gave serious consideration to what was 
happening in the community in arriving at their decision. The police department 
has stations in the two main immigrant neighborhoods. Each month, the 
commander of each station holds a meeting with residents to discuss community 
issues and concerns. In these meetings, the commanders learned that 
undocumented residents were reluctant to attend; they usually expressed their 
concerns through a local Catholic priest.270 Prior to the adoption of the formal 
policy, officers in these neighborhoods attempted to gain the trust of the 
immigrant communities through intensive outreach that met with some success. 
However, some police practices—particularly those related to questions about 
immigration status or identification documents—were misinterpreted, and 
immigrants often complained about disrespectful police behavior.271 This dialogue 
and the input from immigrant advocacy groups led to the creation of a new policy 
for the department as well as the city’s launch of a municipal identification card 
program for all residents irrespective of immigration status.272 New Haven’s 
immigrant-friendly image is one that the city has worked hard to promote through 
 
267. See supra notes 35–42 and accompanying text. 
268. HOFFMASTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 6. 
269. Id. 
270. Id. at 4–5. 
271. Id. at 5. 
272. Id. at 6. Although some officers do not understand the process and stringent 
requirements for the identification cards, in general, New Haven police officers regard the card as a 
good tool that helps them identify city residents, saving time and resources by eliminating the need to 
hold a person until documents are authenticated. Id. at 9. 
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special programs and policies, all with the purpose of “ensuring the safety of all of 
its residents, including undocumented persons.”273 
Better policing was the motivation for hammering out the current approach 
to immigrants in Prince William County, Virginia, as well. Evidence of that 
motivation is symbolized by the process that the police chief followed in order to 
convince local politicians to modify their plans to implement a very strict anti-
immigrant approach to public safety.274 The community was highly polarized over 
the issue of immigration. Anti-immigrant protests, email campaigns, and town hall 
testimony by hundreds of residents pressured county board members. Ultimately 
the board unanimously approved a policy that restricted social services for 
undocumented immigrants, instructed the police to enter into a 287(g) agreement 
with ICE, and required officers to ask about any detained person’s immigration 
status “if there is probable cause to believe such a person is in violation of federal 
immigration law.”275  
Throughout the volatile process, the police chief urged restraint and a 
balanced approach because, he said, “I have a responsibility to provide service to 
the entire community—no matter how they got here. It is in the best interest of 
our community to trust the police.”276 He feared that the board action would 
increase the number of “silent victims” in immigrant communities, as the 
department’s relationship with the community soured and public trust eroded.277 
The chief insisted that the order to detain individuals suspected of being 
undocumented was problematic and could lead to “racial profiling” litigation 
against the department.278 After consulting with other police departments and the 
county attorney, the county board of supervisors revised the policy in two ways: 
(1) immigration status inquiries are not required unless the person is arrested, not 
simply detained, and (2) the inquiry is made of every person arrested, not just 
those suspected of being foreign born.279 Thus, crime witnesses and victims are 
not subject to questioning about immigration status. 
In contrast to Prince William County, Montgomery County, Maryland, was 
regarded as having political leadership that was much more liberal and accepting 
of undocumented immigrants. The police chief in Montgomery County addressed 
the issue proactively. Certainly, he wanted to get undocumented immigrant 
criminals “off the streets,” but the policy had to “allow officers to maintain the 
relationships that they had worked to build within various communities.”280 He 
did not want his officers to be in the business of enforcing federal immigration 
 
273. Id. at 10. 
274. See supra notes 43–51 and accompanying text. 
275. HOFFMASTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 15–17. 
276. Id. at 15–16 (quoting Police Chief Charlie T. Deane). 
277. Id. at 15. 
278. Id. at 17. 
279. Id. at 18. 
280. Id. at 21–22. 
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laws because that would make it difficult for police “to foster trust and 
cooperation with everyone in these immigrant communities.”281 His meetings with 
community residents provided the chief with opportunities to clarify any 
misunderstandings, and the input he received influenced his plan. The policy that 
was ultimately adopted does require forwarding names of persons arrested and 
charged with certain serious crimes. However, inquiries about immigration status 
are not made of crime witnesses and victims. The chief learned of misinformation 
to the contrary, so he constantly engaged in community outreach on the policy to 
dispel rumors.282 
The sanctuary policies for crime victims and witnesses developed in Phoenix 
and Mesa, Arizona, are also grounded on a theory of public safety and the 
promotion of better policing. In Phoenix, the focus is on violent crime and on 
maintaining a positive relationship with the immigrant community. As one officer 
put it, “The Phoenix Police Department can’t afford to squander the trust 
issue. . . . When we come out of the immigration cloud, we must have our 
reputation and trust intact.”283 The department constantly invests time and 
resources into improving communications with the immigrant community and to 
respond to criminal activity irrespective of immigration status.284 The department 
knows that the cooperation of all residents—even those who are in 
undocumented status—is required to ensure the safety of the entire community.285 
The philosophy in Mesa, Arizona, is similar. The mayor and police officers 
were openly critical of Sheriff Arpaio’s operations in their city because his actions 
undermined the police department’s relationship with the immigrant community 
and “set back the Police Department’s efforts to build trust.”286 While trust and 
community confidence are the goals behind the police department’s policy of not 
inquiring about immigration status when it comes to crime victims and witnesses, 
the battle is difficult because the distinction between federal (ICE), county 
(Arpaio), and local (police department) law enforcement is confusing for the 
immigrant community. As one officer put it, “You’re not sure if you ever gain the 
trust. Maybe you just lessen the mistrust.”287 In spite of the tense atmosphere over 
immigration in Arizona, the Mesa police chief was determined not to adopt a 
policy that would damage the trust of a significant part of the community who 
were often victims or witnesses to crime. He held community meetings to 
encourage residents to discuss priorities and communication and consulted ICE. 
A new policy finally was adopted after seventeen revisions, followed by several 
 
281. Id. at 22 (quoting Police Chief J. Thomas Manger). 
282. Id. at 24. 
283. Id. at 35. 
284. Id. 
285. Id. at 36. 
286. Id. at 39 (quoting Police District Commander Steve Stahl). 
287. Id. at 40. 
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months of officer training.288 Although the city takes pains not to be labeled a 
“sanctuary” for undocumented immigrants, perhaps for political reasons, the 
focus of the policy is on criminals, not crime victims or witnesses, and the 
department engages in continuous outreach to the immigration community.289 In 
testimony before Congress, Mesa’s police chief made clear why the immigration 
status of crime victims and witnesses needs to remain off the table: 
Community policing efforts are being derailed where immigrants who 
fear that the police will help deport them rely less on the local authorities 
and instead give thugs control of their neighborhoods.  
. . . . It is nearly impossible to gain the required trust to make community 
policing a reality in places where the community fears the police will help 
deport them, or deport a neighbor, friend or relative. 290 
The goal of gaining trust in immigrant communities as an important step in 
achieving public safety for the entire community through sanctuary policies is 
evident in many other jurisdictions: 
 In San Jose, California, the police chief has warned that using a 
shrinking pool of officers to target undocumented immigrants is 
inefficient, costly and would make cities more dangerous, not less. 
Looking to reassure its own large and growing Latino community, 
San Jose has long broadcast that it does not participate in 
immigration raids. Officers are ordered not to investigate someone’s 
immigration status even during arrests. San Jose police officers are 
looking to greatly improve their frayed relationship with immigrant 
communities amid allegations of overaggressive policing and racial 
profiling. The chief also discontinued a policy in which cars of 
unlicensed drivers stopped for minor traffic violations were 
impounded for a month—a policy many felt unfairly targeted the 
undocumented Latino community.291 
 Officials in Providence, Rhode Island, ironically where Danny Sigui 
was deported after testifying as a witness in a 2003 murder trial,292 
want to opt out of ICE’s Secure Communities program293 because 
the “success of [the] city’s community policing program has been 
based on the trust developed between law enforcement and the 
 
288. Id. at 42. 
289. Id. at 43. 
290. Public Safety and Civil Rights Implications of State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration 
Laws: J. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec., & Int’l Law and the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, & Civil Liberties of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 111th Cong. 
84 (2009) (testimony of George Gascón, Chief, Mesa Police Dep’t, Mesa, Ariz.). 
291. Sean Webby, San Jose: Chief Says Local Cops Shouldn’t Be Involved in Immigration Enforcement, 
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 16, 2011. 
292. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text. 
293. See infra notes 332–34 and accompanying text (describing the Secure Communities 
Program). 
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community—especially the immigrant community.” City leaders 
worry that the Secure Communities program will breed fear and 
mistrust, undermining community policing practices. Witnesses and 
crime victims—including documented and undocumented 
immigrants—may shy away from the police, fearing that contact may 
lead to immigration problems.294 
 The Minneapolis Police Department has had a policy in place for 
years that prohibits officers from asking about immigration status. 
That policy predates a city ordinance, passed in 2003, that prohibits 
all city employees from inquiring about immigration status.295 Police 
understand that building trust is a challenge for immigrant 
communities, including newcomers like Somalis. With the sanctuary 
policy as a foundation and using bilingual interpreters, the police 
work to establish trust by building relationships through regular 
meetings and conversations with community members, accessing 
Somali radio shows, distributing flyers in neighborhoods, and even 
making door-to-door visits.296 
 Takoma Park, Maryland, adopted a sanctuary ordinance in 1985 that 
prohibits all local officials from releasing any information regarding 
the citizenship or immigration status of any individual to any third 
party. The city reaffirmed this policy in 2007 by declaring that 
“enforcement of immigration laws by the Takoma Park Police 
Department will discourage immigrant residents from reporting 
crimes and suspicious activity, and cooperating with criminal 
investigations; and . . . as a matter of public safety, the protection of 
a person’s citizenship and immigrant status will engender trust and 
cooperation between law enforcement officials and immigrant 
communities to aid in crime prevention and solving, and will 
discourage the threat of immigrant and racial profiling and 
harassment.”297 
 Speaking in support of his department’s community policing policies, 
the police chief of Lowell, Massachusetts pointed out, “When 
immigrant residents of Lowell are afraid to report crimes because 
they worry that contact with my officers could lead to deportation, 
criminals are allowed to roam free and the entire community suffers 
as a result.”298 
 The state of Oregon has a statewide sanctuary law prohibiting police 
agencies and local governments from using any resources to 
 
294. Gregory Smith, Providence Wants to Opt Out of ‘Secure Communities’ Database, PROVIDENCE 
J., Feb. 23, 2011. 
295. HOFFMASTER ET AL., supra note 9, at 50. 
296. Id. at 51–52. 
297. City of Takoma Park, Md., Ordinance No. 2007-58 (Oct. 29, 2007), available at http:// 
www.takomaparkmd.gov/clerk/agenda/items/2007/102907-2.pdf. 
298. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 6. 
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apprehend or report undocumented immigrants.299 The state’s largest 
city—Portland—has its own official sanctuary ordinance as 
well. Both measures are promoted as important steps in developing 
trust in immigrant communities to insure public safety for all 
residents.300 
The sanctuary policies discussed in this article fall within what some refer to 
as “community oriented policy,” “confidentiality policies,” or “preventive” 
policing.301 They prohibit immigration status inquiries of individuals not suspected 
of having committed crimes.302 The success of these policies “hinges upon the 
development of trust between community residents and law enforcement officials. 
For communities with significant immigrant populations, building trust means 
getting immigrants to know that if they are victimized by crime or they witness a 
crime, they can approach the police and not fear immigration-related 
consequences.”303 These policies are premised in part on the fact that immigrants 
are often victimized by criminals who assume that no report will be made out of 
fear of being deported.304  
By whatever name—sanctuary policies, confidentiality practices, community 
policing—state and local rules that require law enforcement officers to refrain 
 
299. OR. REV. STAT. § 181.850 (2007). 
Enforcement of federal immigration laws. 
(1) No law enforcement agency of the State of Oregon or of any political subdivision 
of the state shall use agency moneys, equipment or personnel for the purpose of detecting 
or apprehending persons whose only violation of law is that they are persons of foreign 
citizenship present in the United States in violation of federal immigration laws. 
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, a law enforcement agency may 
exchange information with the United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, the United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services and the 
United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection in order to: 
(a) Verify the immigration status of a person if the person is arrested for any 
criminal offense; or 
(b) Request criminal investigation information with reference to persons 
named in records of the United States Bureau of Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, the United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services or 
the United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. 
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, a law enforcement agency may 
arrest any person who: 
(a) Is charged by the United States with a criminal violation of federal 
immigration laws under Title II of the Immigration and Nationality Act or 18 U.S.C. 
1015, 1422 to 1429 or 1505; and 
(b) Is subject to arrest for the crime pursuant to a warrant of arrest issued by a 
federal magistrate. 
Id. 
300. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 7. In Portland, the relationship between immigrant 
communities and police improved as police-community dialogue gave immigrants a better sense of 
security. Id. 
301. See supra note 32. 
302. NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT BY STATE AND 
LOCAL POLICE 3 (2007). 
303. Id. at 2. 
304. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 7. 
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from asking crime witnesses, crime victims, and, in some instances, minor 
offenders about immigration status are intended to promote public safety. Their 
goal is to gain the immigrant community’s trust—trust that is needed for the 
community’s cooperation. Through that cooperation, the entire community is 
safer. The policies are adopted as measures of good policing. 
V. GOOD PUBLIC POLICY 
The success of sanctuary policies is evident:  
  As departments around the country embraced community policing, 
crime rates dropped substantially. Between 1993 and 2005, violent crime 
rates fell 57 percent for the general population, and 55 percent for the 
Latino population. The downward trend was attributed in many state and 
local police agencies, in part, to community policing strategies.305 
These good policing measures have indeed turned into good public policy 
decisions that have achieved greater public safety. 
Not surprisingly, law enforcement organizations have come to recognize the 
positive public policy ramifications of sanctuary policies. According to the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), one of the “central 
benchmarks of a well-commanded police department is establishing good 
relationships with the local communities, including those composed of 
immigrants. Working with these communities is critical in preventing and 
investigating crimes.”306 The IACP warns, 
  Immigration enforcement by state and local police could have a 
chilling effect in immigrant communities and could limit cooperation 
with police by members of those communities. Local police agencies 
depend on the cooperation of immigrants, [documented and 
undocumented], in solving all sorts of crimes and in the maintenance of 
public order. Without assurances that they will not be subject to an 
immigration investigation and possible deportation, many immigrants 
with critical information would not come forward, even when heinous 
crimes are committed against them or their families. Because many 
families with undocumented family members also include legal immigrant 
members, this would drive a potential wedge between police and huge 
portions of the legal immigrant community as well. 
  This will be felt most immediately in situations of domestic violence. 
For example, many law enforcement agencies have been addressing the 
difficult issues related to domestic abuse and the reluctance of some 
victims to contact the police. This barrier is heightened when the victim 
is an immigrant and rightly or wrongly perceives her tormentor to wield 
 
305. NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 302, at 2. 
306. INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, POLICE CHIEFS GUIDE TO IMMIGRATION ISSUES 
21 (2007). 
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the power to control her ability to stay in the country. The word will get 
out quickly that contacting the local police can lead to deportation or 
being separated by a border from one’s children. Should local police 
begin enforcing immigration laws, more women and children struggling 
with domestic violence will avoid police intervention and help.307 
The IACP cautions cannot be taken lightly: the prevalence of mixed families 
(families with both documented and undocumented members) in the United 
States and the particular challenge that domestic violence presents render the need 
for immigration confidentiality particularly high. 
The reticence to call police that is born of fear that lack of immigration 
status will “trump the criminal justice protections afforded crime victims” is a 
concern that reaches far beyond immigrant communities.308 If victims are deterred 
from calling the police, criminals will not be held accountable. That leaves 
perpetrators free to commit other crimes, perhaps against U.S. citizens and lawful 
resident aliens.309 
In spite of these data that verify the decline of crime rates in sanctuary 
localities and situations that demand confidentiality, critics argue that sanctuary 
policies forestall the removal of dangerous criminal immigrants.310 However, a 
2007 audit by the DOJ Office of Inspector General found that sanctuary or 
confidentiality policies “did not violate federal law and did not impede police 
cooperation with ICE regarding criminals in police custody.”311 Thus, the claim of 
obstruction appears meritless. 
When the Department of Justice audited programs that received federal 
criminal assistance funds to defray costs of incarcerating criminal aliens, special 
attention was paid to jurisdictions that had sanctuary policies to determine if 
police cooperation with ICE was impeded. In fact, when auditors looked closely at 
the state of Oregon and San Francisco (two jurisdictions with sanctuary laws) as 
well as New York City (because of its executive order), “in each instance the local 
policy either did not preclude cooperation with ICE or else included a statement 
to the effect that those agencies and officers will assist ICE or share information 
 
307. GENE VOEGTLIN, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, ENFORCING IMMIGRATION 
LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE, TRIBAL AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 5 (2004), available at 
http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/Publications/ImmigrationEnforcementconf.pdf. 
308. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 6 (quoting Leslye Orloff, Director of the Immigrant Women 
Program of Legal Momento and cofounder of the National Network to End Violence Against 
Immigrant Women). 
309. Id. 
310. For example, this “sanctuary cities resource” website, which keeps track of sanctuary 
jurisdictions, maligns those jurisdictions that have adopted sanctuary policies. About the Sanctuary Cities 
Resource Site, http://www.sanctuarycities.info/sanctuary_cities_about.htm (last visited Dec. 8, 2011). 
The website claims that these jurisdictions are “defying ICE and other federal agencies whose goal it 
is to reduce terrorism and keep criminals and other law breakers out of the United States.” Id. 
311. NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, supra note 302, at 4. 
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with ICE as required by federal law.”312 There simply is no truth to the assertion 
that serious criminal aliens are averting immigration consequences because of 
sanctuary policies. In the words of DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff in 2007, “I’m 
not aware of any city . . . that actually interfered with our ability to enforce the 
law.”313 Once a noncitizen is convicted of a serious offense, the person is reported 
to immigration authorities in every sanctuary jurisdiction. 
In contrast, serious public policy problems can arise in cities that do not have 
clear sanctuary or confidentiality policies. Community trust in the police can be 
eroded, and public safety for everyone can be negatively affected. For example, in 
2007, the New Jersey Attorney General issued a directive ordering police to 
question individuals about their immigration status upon arrest for a serious crime. 
If an officer has “reason to believe” that such an individual is an undocumented 
immigrant, the individual must be referred to ICE. However, the directive was 
silent as to whether police should question a person about immigration status and 
refer to ICE in other contexts, such as traffic stops or street encounters. A survey 
of sixty-eight individuals referred to ICE by New Jersey law enforcement officials 
when only a minor offense or no offense was charged revealed troubling data: 
 Sixty-five were Latino; 
 Forty-nine were questioned about their immigration status and turned 
over to ICE following a traffic stop, either based on a minor 
infringement, such as rolling through a stop sign, or based on no 
identifiable reason at all (forty-one as drivers, eight as passengers); and 
 Nineteen were stopped by police on the street and questioned about 
their immigration status (seven for drinking in public, the others for no 
apparent reason at all).314 
In addition to these individuals, other persons who were witnesses or victims 
of crime also were questioned about their immigration status. One man called the 
police after he had been assaulted on the street by two men. The victim was 
detained for two days and transferred to ICE custody because he could not 
produce any identification.315 Police questioned another man in his home as part 
of the investigation of a neighbor. The police detained the man after asking about 
 
312. AUDIT DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COOPERATION OF SCAAP RECIPIENTS IN THE 
REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES viii, x–xi, 27–28 (2007). 
313. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 9. One might be concerned that sanctuary policies would 
hamper efforts to deal with criminal aliens or even terrorists. See, e.g., Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, 
Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449 (2006). However, the 
assurances by Secretary Chertoff and the DOJ audit should dispel such concerns. 
314. BASSINA FARBENBLUM & JESSICA JANSYN, SETON HALL UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 
CROSSING THE LINE: DAMAGING IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PRACTICES BY NEW JERSEY 
POLICE FOLLOWING ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE 2007-3, at 4 (2009). 
315. Id. at 15. 
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his immigration status.316 Individuals involved in car accidents were detained after 
police arrived and asked about immigration status.317 
These incidents send the wrong message to immigrant communities for 
those who are concerned about public safety for the entire community. Little 
wonder that victims and witnesses are hesitant to come forward if they fear being 
questioned about their own immigration status. In the words of the former 
Newark Police Chief, 
The reluctance of local police to enforce federal immigration law grows 
out of the difficulty of balancing federal and local interests in ways that 
do not diminish the ability of the police to maintain their core mission of 
maintaining public safety, which depends heavily on public trust. In 
communities where people fear the police, very little information is 
shared with officers, undermining the police capacity for crime control 
and quality service delivery. As a result, these areas become breeding 
grounds for drug trafficking, human smuggling, terrorist activity, and 
other serious crimes. As a police chief . . . asked, “How do you police a 
community that will not talk to you?318 
Voicing similar concerns about the aftereffects of a joint operation by federal 
agents and Chandler, Arizona police, the Attorney General of Arizona at the time, 
Grant Wood, called for an investigation because the operation “created an 
atmosphere of fear and uncertainty [that] greatly harmed the trust relationship” 
between police and residents.319 
In contrast, police took a preventive police approach in Austin, Texas, when 
they realized that forty-seven percent of reported robbery victims were Latino, 
even though Latinos constituted only twenty-eight percent of the population and 
many robberies went unreported.320 Police initiated an outreach campaign to the 
Spanish-speaking community to encourage undocumented residents to report 
crimes if they were victims or witnesses. Their message was clear: “Trust us. We 
are not immigration, we are not going to arrest you, and we are not going to 
deport you.”321 A twenty-percent increase in robbery reports followed. But then 
the police did more. To reduce the victimization of undocumented residents, they 




318. Public Safety and Civil Rights Implications of State and Local Enforcement of Fed. Immigration Laws: 
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purposes of opening bank accounts. Undocumented residents no longer had to 
hide or carry their cash around, and robberies declined.322 
In short, sanctuary policies are a better public policy choice. They work. 
They encourage trust—a necessary ingredient to problem-solving community 
policing models, providing hope to police departments across the country.323 They 
promote public safety for everyone.  
Sanctuary policies also are good public policy in an era when, unfortunately, 
anti-immigrant rhetoric that breeds hatred and distrust runs high in many quarters; 
and at times, the hate turns violent.324 Sanctuary policies are important emblems 
of inclusion, public statements that counter the vitriol spawned by misguided 
souls. Sanctuary policies make sense because, like it or not, undocumented 
immigrants are a part of the community and shunning them does harm to all of 
us. Sanctuary policies send a message of rapport and trust. 
The Supreme Court confronted an analogous public policy decision in 1982 
when it struck down Texas’s attempt to deny undocumented children access to 
elementary and secondary public schools. Even though undocumented status was 
not deemed a suspect classification and the right to education was not regarded as 
fundamental, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court noted, 
[M]any of the undocumented children disabled by this classification will 
remain in this country indefinitely, and . . . some will become lawful 
residents or citizens of the United States. It is difficult to understand 
precisely what the State hopes to achieve by promoting the creation and 
perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our boundaries, surely 
adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime. 
It is thus clear that whatever savings might be achieved by denying these 
children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs 
involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.325  
This remarkable statement of inclusion was an important philosophical 
policy announcement that also was wise as a practical matter—the entire country 
would pay the price if these students were not afforded the opportunity to be 
educated.  
Similarly, the entire community loses when we force a segment into the 
shadows of mistrust and fear of local law enforcement officials. Many in the so-
called undocumented community will someday become lawful residents and 
citizens. Many are members of mixed families where a parent, a child, or a sibling 
already is a lawful resident or citizen. Most interact with other residents of the 
entire community on a daily basis and might be present to witness a crime or 
 
322. Id. at 192–93. 
323. Id. at 222. 
324. See Bill Ong Hing, Vigilante Racism: The De-Americanization of Immigrant America, 7 MICH. J. 
RACE & L. 441 (2002). 
325. Id. at 230. 
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provide aid to someone who is in trouble. The members of these communities 
need to be integrated, not shunned, for good public policy reasons. 
Governmental institutions need to play a lead role in integration efforts, and 
sanctuary policies set the necessary tone. The influence of local leaders and 
government agencies can have overwhelmingly positive and immediate effects on 
the lives of immigrants. Important forms of civic engagement are not predicated 
on formal U.S. citizenship. Schools, neighborhoods, community groups, and 
public service programs can all benefit from the immediate involvement of 
immigrants. The alternative—as illustrated in the hellish environment created by 
Sheriff Joe Arpaio in Maricopa County, Arizona326—breeds fear and distrust 
within the immigrant community, while promoting hate by misguided community 
residents who follow Arpaio’s lead. Rejecting the Arpaio world through alternative 
public policy choices is a legitimate decision that should be promoted. 
VI. CLOSING 
In the interest of public safety, thousands of law enforcement agencies 
across the country engage in some form of sanctuary policy—officially or 
unofficially.327 This is an important message of inclusion, integration, and outreach 
to immigrant communities in our increasingly diverse nation. Official numbers 
likely understate the actual level of de-emphasis that local law enforcement 
officials practice when it comes to checking the immigration status of individuals 
they encounter for minor matters, traffic offenses,328 or as crime witnesses or 
 
326. Prior to Arizona S.B. 1070, Sheriff Arpaio received widespread attention for his 
immigration enforcement antics pursuant to a 287(g) agreement with ICE. As part of his aggressive 
enforcement practices, Arpaio trained deputies to use minor traffic violations as an opportunity to 
check individuals’ legal status. At Arpaio’s county jail, prisoners were forced to wear black-and-white 
striped uniforms, with pink socks and underwear. Randy James, Sheriff Joe Arpaio, TIME (Oct. 13, 
2009), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1929920,00.html. In opening a new jail 
facility, he ordered seven hundred maximum-security prisoners to march four blocks to a new jail 
facility wearing only pink underwear and flip-flops. Id. Arpaio, who refers to himself as the “toughest 
sheriff” in the country is under investigation for breaking civil rights laws. Pierre Thomas, Controversial 
Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio Under Investigation for Allegedly Violating Civil Rights, ABC NEWS (Sept. 13, 
2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/arizona-sheriff-joe-arpaio-investigation-us-department-justice/ 
story?id=11556736. The allegations include: “unlawful searches and seizures, discriminatory police 
conduct, and a failure to provide basic services to individuals with limited English.” Id. The Justice 
Department also has filed a lawsuit accusing Arpaio of obstructing the department’s civil rights 
investigation. Id. 
327. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
328. I realize that for traffic stops, if the driver does not offer at least a form of identification 
that is acceptable to the officer, this can lead to immigration status questioning. That makes the 
issuance of driver’s licenses to undocumented immigrants vitally important. Short of that, the issuance 
of local municipal identification cards that are acceptable to local police (as in New Haven) or the 
recognition of Mexican Consul-issued matriculas are very necessary. An incident in sanctuary-friendly 
San Francisco underscores the problem. Katie Worth, Driver’s Arrest Ignites Sanctuary City Debate, S.F. 
EXAMINER (July 10, 2010), http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/driver-s-arrest-ignites-sanctuary-city-
debate. On June 2, 2010, police stopped a driver who failed to come to a complete stop at a stop sign. 
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victims. Even without an “official” sanctuary policy, the officer’s choice is one 
born of a sense that most folks in these categories that they encounter who are 
likely immigrants should be allowed to go about their lives without an intrusion 
from federal immigration officials. Even if they are not intending to send a 
message of inclusion, these officers find it unwise, or at least unnecessary, to send 
an Arizona S.B. 1070 message of unwelcome. 
The constitutionality of sanctuary policies is clear. Unlike anti-immigrant 
subfederal laws intended to regulate immigration, sanctuary policies, community 
policing, and confidentiality approaches are not about regulating the admission of 
immigrants. Sanctuary policies are about public safety and decisions on how to 
spend public funds and establish priorities, and therefore are not preempted. 
Congress cannot commandeer local authorities to enforce federal immigration 
laws. Thus, as long as sanctuary communities that choose not to ask about 
immigration status do not bar volunteer communications and follow other federal 
requirements of cooperation, they clearly are not preempted. In fact, I believe that 
there is a good argument that policies that instruct police officers not to ask about 
immigration status and also not to talk about immigration status that they are 
aware of may also be protected; a federal statute that is intended to mandate 
subfederal entities to allow voluntary communication could very well run afoul of 
the Tenth Amendment depending on how courts view the mandate-prohibition 
distinction. The central teaching of the Tenth Amendment cases is that even 
where Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or 
prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the states to require 
or prohibit those acts. Congress may not, therefore, directly compel states or 
localities to enact or to administer policies or programs adopted by the federal 
government. It may not directly shift to the states enforcement and administrative 
responsibilities allocated to the federal government by the Constitution. Such a 
reallocation would not only diminish the political accountability of both state and 
federal officers, but it would also compromise the structural framework of dual 
sovereignty and separation of powers. Thus, Congress may not directly force 
states to assume enforcement or administrative responsibilities constitutionally 
vested in the federal government. Forcing subfederal entities to allow voluntary 
cooperation raises the specter of violating those principles. 
Sanctuary policies can, however, be thwarted by the use of overzealous 
federal initiatives. For example, 287(g) agreements between ICE and local law 
enforcement officials were meant to focus on the identification and removal of 
 
Id. The driver did not have a driver’s license, but did provide a name and date of birth. Id. When 
officers performed a background check in the patrol car computer—standard procedure for every 
traffic stop—no criminal history was found, but a federal immigration warrant popped up with the 
same name and date of birth. Id. Since police could not confirm that the driver was the same person 
with the immigration warrant, he was arrested on suspicion of driving without a license and reported 
to ICE. Id. 
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dangerous criminal aliens. However, we have seen these agreements abused not 
simply by the likes of Sheriff Arpaio, but by other local officials as well—more 
than half of those deported under 287(g) were for minor offenses,329 and even 
some citizens have been mistakenly deported.330 In many 287(g) jurisdictions, 
immigrants fear the police and avoid public spaces.331 Likewise, the Secure 
Communities initiative that refers fingerprint information to DHS via the FBI for 
all participating jurisdictions was also intended to focus on serious criminals. Yet, 
the vast majority of individuals removed as a result of Secure Communities 
referrals also have been noncriminal or low-level offenders.332 And DHS has taken 
the strict position on Secure Communities that it can access all fingerprints 
submitted to the FBI by local law enforcement officials even without the 
permission of state and local officials.333 Secure Communities “casts too wide a 
 
329. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 8 (citing a Migration Policy Institute report); Nate Rau, 
287(g) Deportation Program Snags Few Felons, Memos from Feds Show; Critics Hit Deportation Program, THE 
TENNESSEAN (Nashville) (Oct. 24, 2010), available at http://mexicanexpulsions.blogspot.com/2010/ 
10/287g-deportation-program-snags-few.html. 
330. Pedro Guzman, a U.S. citizen born in California, is a developmentally disabled man who 
was deported after the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department mistakenly referred him to ICE pursuant to 
a 287(g) agreement. Sam Quinones, Disabled Man Found After 89-Day Ordeal, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 8, 
2007), http://articles.latimes.com/2007/aug/08/local/me-found8; Joanne Lin, End It: 287(g) is Beyond 
Repair and Harms Local Communities Every Day, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (Apr. 5, 2010), 
http://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/end-it-287g-beyond-repair-and-harms-local-communities-
every-day. Mark Lyttle, a U.S. citizen was deported even though immigration officials had criminal 
record checks that said he was a U.S. citizen. Kristin Collins, N.C. Native Wrongly Deported to Mexico, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Aug. 30, 2009), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2009/08/30/917007/ 
nc-native-wrongly-deported-to.html. They had his Social Security number and the names of his 
parents. Id. They had Lyttle’s own sworn statement that he had been born in North Carolina. Id. 
CNN researchers have found that every year hundreds of U.S. citizens are deported by mistake. Lisa 
DiVirgilio, Report: Hundreds of U.S. Citizens Wrongfully Deported Every Year, THE POST STANDARD 
(Syracuse, NY) (July 26, 2010), http://www.syracuse.com/news/index.ssf/2010/07/report_hundreds_ 
of_us_citizens.html. 
331. TRAMONTE, supra note 2, at 8–9 (citing a Migration Policy Institute report). 
332. Id. at 8; see MICHELE WASLIN, IMMIGR. POLICY CTR., THE SECURE COMMUNITIES 
PROGRAM: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND CONTINUING CONCERNS, Nov. 2011, available at http:// 
www.immigrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/docs/Secure_Communities_112911_updated.pdf; Rachel 
R. Ray, Insecure Communities: Examining Local Government Participation in U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement’s ‘Secure Communities’ Program (Seattle J. for Social Justice, 2011), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1941826. For example, an abused woman in San Francisco 
worked up the courage to call police, but she was arrested as well because the police saw a “red mark” 
on the alleged abuser’s check. Lee Romney & Paloma Esquivel, Caught in a Very Wide Net: A Federal 
Deportation Program Snares Many Noncriminals and Low-Level Offenders, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2011, at A1. 
The charges against her were dropped, but her fingerprints were already forwarded to ICE under the 
Secure Communities program, and she faced deportation. Id. This case was an exact replica of one 
that occurred in Maryland. 
333. Tara Bahrampour, Immigration Authority Terminates Secure Communities Agreements, WASH. 
POST (Aug. 7, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/immigration-authority-terminates-
secure-communities-agreements/2011/08/05/gIQAlwx80I_story.html. ICE Director John Morton 
announced, “We’re going to continue the program, but we’re going to do it without [written 
agreements].” Id. All states have signed agreements with the FBI to send arrestees’ fingerprints to the 
FBI for criminal history checks. This is important for local law enforcement who need to know if an 
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net and scoops up the fingerprints of everyone not born in the United States 
whether or not they pose a criminal risk.”334 Similarly, many local law enforcement 
officials who use the National Crime Information Center database, a catalog of 
information on arrest warrants and wanted persons, can receive civil immigration 
violation information or erroneous immigration information that has led to the 
removal of noncriminal aliens.335 Given these outcomes, the challenge that many 
sanctuary and other forward-thinking communities have launched against the 
misuse of such programs is critical to ensuring that their communities do not 
become Gestapo-esque.336  
The adoption of sanctuary policies at a time when segments of our nation 
are in a frenzy over immigration is an important, bold statement of support for a 
nation of immigrants. Choosing sanctuary policies over policies of fear tells 
immigrants and the rest of us what type of community our leaders and law 
enforcement officials are choosing. The nonsanctuary choice is closed-minded, 
resistant to continuing changes that will only breed tension and threaten public 
safety. The choice of sanctuary, confidentiality, or “don’t ask” is one of smart 
policing—one that embraces change and encourages integration in the hopes of 
building a stronger, safer community. That choice also represents an important 
step toward avoiding the pitfalls of division, hate, and insular living. 
  
 
arrestee is wanted by another jurisdiction, for example. However, the confiscation of the fingerprints 
from the FBI by ICE is not part of these agreements, and the ICE action raises serious Tenth 
Amendment commandeering practices that will likely be subject to constitutional challenge. See supra 
notes 169–171 and accompanying text. 
334. Michael Hennessey, Secure Communities Destroys Public Trust, S.F. CHRONICLE, May 1, 2011 
(Hennessey was the Sheriff of San Francisco until January 2012, when he retired); see also infra note 
336. 
335. HOFFMASTER ET AL., supra note 9, at viii, 14, 21, 23, 62; Laura Sullivan, Comment, 
Enforcing Nonenforcement: Countering the Threat Posed to Sanctuary Laws by the Inclusion of Immigration Records 
in the National Crime Information Center Database, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 567 (2009). 
336. Many police departments are critical of the problems with the National Crime 
Information Center database, arguing that “controls are needed to eliminate the entering of civil 
detainers into a system intended for criminal warrants, which creates confusion for local policy, and 
may cause them to exceed their authority by arresting a person on a civil detainer.’’ HOFFMASTER ET 
AL., supra note 9, at viii, 14, 62. Local jurisdictions that have attempted to opt out of the Secure 
Communities initiative include Santa Clara County, California, Artlington County, Virginia, and the 
City and County of San Francisco. WASLIN, supra note 332, at 11–12. The governors of Illinois and 
Massachusetts have sought to terminate their Secure Communities agreement with ICE, and the 
governor of Massachusetts declined to sign an agreement with ICE. Id. However, in August 2011, 
ICE took the position that it did not need written agreements with state officials to have access to 
fingerprints submitted to the FBI. Id. ICE argues that under 8 U.S.C. § 1722(a)(2), federal agencies 
can share information with impunity. Id. In other words, Secure Communities is “mandatory.” Id. 
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